Annotated literature review associated with the project, ‘Comparative Perspectives on Conflict Management in Asia’

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Note

This review contains description from a non-exhaustive selection of material relevant to militias in Mindanao. It aims to provide the reader with a broad overview of key points and is not intended to be a strict academic literature review.
I. Militias in Mindanao


This piece is part of a series of articles on security sector reform in the Philippines funded by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Foundation. Its main focus is on reports of misuse of funds allocated to Citizen’s Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU). Audit findings indicated many instances of double payment. To tackle this issue, in December 2003, the then chief of the Philippine Army issued an order that transformed 16 battalions into CAFGU battalions. The CAFGU battalions then took over the task of administering the CAFGU funds. In addition, computerization of records and payment processes has been undertaken. However reports of fund mismanagement continue.

Bagayaua observes that such problems relating to the CAFGU could be more structural in nature, rooted in the role that CAFGUs play in the government’s fight against insurgency. The CAFGUs were principally created to hold areas after the military cleared them of insurgent troops. The army has 80,000 troops, and this is not considered enough to cover the entire archipelago. Therefore CAFGUs represents a critical addition of security personnel.

However, the CAFGUs, who are technically ‘volunteers’ are not subject to stringent selection procedure and lengthy detailed training. In addition, there is a tendency to attract inappropriate characters to its ranks. Another concern is that since they receive no benefits such as pension, the incentive for sustained good behaviour is limited. Bagayaua notes that while the 1987 constitution banned paramilitary groups, the CAFGUs were re-formed with the same people under a different name and structure. It also points out that numerous cases of human rights abuses including murder, execution, torture, disappearance, illegal arrest, and detention have been filed with the Philippines Commission on Human Rights (PCHR) against CAFGU members.

The article also explains the distinction between regular CAFGUs and special CAFGU units. Unlike regular CAFGUs whose subsistence allowance and firearms are funded through the army budget, the subsistence allowance and for firearms budget of the special CAFGU units are typically covered by those entities that requested to have them established, such as a local government unit (LGU) or a business person or group. Inevitably, the special units become private armies for the politicians or businesses that fund them. The army is reportedly trying to institute reforms in the way the CAFGUs are managed by enhancing training and introducing more stringent entrance procedures. Requests have also been made for more funding for regular CAFGU companies in order to do away with the special CAFGU units and the problematic way in which they are funded. However, as noted by Bagayaua, some people regard the CAFGUs as a temporary security solution which will be phased out with improved peace and development.

Bagayaua concludes that development is the only long term solution to deal with the problems associated with CAFGUs. A key point has not been fully articulated
however is that the conditions for development which include stability and peace cannot be brought about without a sustained peace process, leading to a lasting political solution.

This article provides a useful explanation of the CAFGU system and the inter-linkage with issues such as funding, good governance and the long-term importance of development.

Available at: [http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/6ItsAllAboutPower.pdf](http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/6ItsAllAboutPower.pdf)

Part of a series of articles funded by the Asia Foundation, this article discusses implications of clan conflict between two major political families, which has its roots in the campaign for the governorship of Maguindanao. This feud has drawn in the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and government security forces: both diverting from, and threatening the peace process. The article examines the prevalence of CAFGUs and Civilian Volunteer Organisations (CVO) as private armies by politicians, with the author noting that the incumbent governor of the province had two CAFGUs loyal to him in addition to another 300 armed civilian volunteers. Bagayaua highlights the confusion regarding the status of CVOs in Maguindanao. While CVOs are considered part of the national security system, and are principally supposed to gather information, under the Local Government Code of the Philippines, they are supposed to be unarmed. In Maguindanao this is not the case.

Bagayaua contends that while police and military resources are often illegally diverted to support the CVOs who are engaged in political feuds, the army has little control over the CVOs and the special CAFGUs. The issue is complicated by the fact that the CVOs often attack and loot communities regarded as sympathetic to the MILF. While not linked to the military command, the army is seen to be partial to them. Further compounding the situation is that members of the CVOs often have private feuds with members of the MILF, leading to violent clashes in which the military invariably get involved. As a consequence, there are numerous calls for greater military control over the CVOs and special CAFGUs.

Bagayaua recalls that violence resulting from electoral rivalries has been avoided in parts of Mindanao by dividing Local Government Units up between major clans. This has led to the creation of new municipalities out of existing ones.

The article neatly conveys the blurring of boundaries between clan warfare, political rivalries and the insurgency in Maguindanao, and is therefore a useful complement to wider study of militias in Mindanao.


This short article provides a background on the creation of the CAFGUs. It recalls that while Article 18, Section 24 of the 1987 constitution banned private armies and paramilitary forces; Article 16, Section 4 of the same document called for the formation of a ‘Citizen Armed Force’. To remedy this, in 1992 and 1995 attempts were made to pass legislation to disband the CAFGUs. These did not meet with
success. Meanwhile, the number of CAFGUs has grown steadily and the army has reportedly requested more funds to expand this programme. Presented in bullet points, this article provides a useful introductory backgrounder on the CAFGU issue.

Balisacan, Ryan H (2009), Continued paramilitarism and its implications on the GRP’s compliance with its CAHRIHL mandate: Situating CAFGUs in the legal framework of human rights and humanitarian law, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City.

The author is a Jurist Doctor of the Philippine College of Law, University of the Philippines. He examined the implications of continued paramilitary existence on the Government of the Philippines’s (GRP) compliance with the Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL). The CARHRIHL is an agreement between the Philippine Government and the National Democratic Front (NDF) signed on the 16th March 1998 in The Hague, The Netherlands.

He noted that continued paramilitarism in the countryside imperilled and threatened GRP’s compliance and respect for human rights and international humanitarian law. CAFGUs are captured easily by parochial interests, political and ideological forces, and private interests – warlords, landowners and politicians, to be used for illicit purposes. It is this vulnerability of paramilitaries that turns them into a group of armed renegades owing allegiance to no law. Abuses by CAFGUs have made it difficult for the GRP to comply with its obligations under the CARHRIHL.

The paper made the following suggestions:

1. A campaign for demobilization and dissolution of the CAFGUs;
2. Orientation of local communities regarding their human rights and basic rights in the context of armed hostilities. Communities must be taught how to assert their rights and demand accountability from erring paramilitaries;
3. Identify the primary causes for the continued and successful recruitment of CAFGUs in an area. Root causes for CAFGU membership should be identified and addressed for possible interventions – livelihood enhancement, education, tempering the influence of local political leaders in the area through appropriate channels etc; and
4. CARHRIHL must be mainstreamed in the collective consciousness of the populace. Educatve measures and information campaign among concerned sectors will greatly contribute in this regard.


This paper provides an overview of Citizen’s Armed Forces Geographical Units Volunteer Organisations (CVO) and vigilante groups in the context of national security and human rights in the Philippines. The paper is a good reference point for details on the origins of the CAFGUs and CVOs. It provides information on the number of CAFGU Active Auxiliaries from 1988 to 2005, and details such as the
allowances and pay they received. Banlaoi also briefly describes nine vigilante groups. It is alleged that in Mindanao alone, at least 34 extremist Christian cults have been converted into vigilante groups to quell the Muslim rebellion.

Banlaoi, an expert on security issues, concludes that despite accusations of alleged involvement in human rights violations, in general, successive Philippine governments regard CAFGUs, CVOs and other vigilante groups as instrumental in the promotion of local security, and a necessary element of national security policy.


Using random sampling and descriptive statistics to analyze the responses of 175 participants, the researcher examined the effectiveness of the CAFGU in relation to the internal security operations of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Key issues examined included: 1) Effectiveness of the CAFGU in relation to its organisational structure, leadership, utilization, administration and control, training and services; 2) Relevance and responsiveness of the CAFGU in the conduct of internal security operations; 3) Essential modifications to the CAFGU in order to be more responsive to the internal security operations of the AFP; and 4) Implications of CAFGU’s responsiveness to attainment of national security.

The study’s findings are summarised as follows:

1) CAFGUs, for 20 years, have greatly contributed to the attainment of peace and order in areas where insurgents have been a threat to state security;

2) Decline in communist insurgency since 1980’s is a manifestation of CAFGU effectiveness;

3) CAFGUs, in order to be more responsive, should be integrated in the AFP’s doctrine and hierarchy;

4) CAFGUs are an inexpensive and effective way of enhancing the country’s internal security environment; and

5) The AFP needs to respond to CAFGU’s economic needs, for example, through livelihood projects to create additional sources of income.

The researcher concluded that the CAFGU program is relevant and responsive to the AFP’s mandate to conduct internal security operations against the communist insurgency. His recommendations included:

1) Reorganising and upgrading the CAFGUs from Company-size to Battalion-size units;

2) Centralising CAFGU administration and control under the AFP;

3) Tightening the control and accounting procedures for firearms issued to CAFGU units;
4) Improving the service status and benefits given to CAFGUs;

5) Enlisting deserving CAFGUs for regular service in AFP of;

6) Deactivating CAFGUs from service in areas where they are no longer needed; and

7) Institutionalizing viable livelihood projects for CAFGUs to improve their wellbeing while in service and when deactivated from service.

The researcher identifies the conceptual shift in the AFP’s strategy from a purely military focus to being a partner of the government in the delivery of basic social services and development efforts in the countryside. As part of this strategy, CAFGUs could be utilized in activities that will bring direct social benefits to people in places where they are recruited. The researcher lists the contributions of the CAFGU program to national security including:

1) Political dimension – provides security and strengthens Local Government Unit (LGU) control of its administered area against insurgents’.

2) Military dimension – a decline in insurgents’ activities is noticed once CAFGUs became part of military operations. At the same time, their maintenance cost is much less than that of the regular army.

3) Socio-cultural dimension – CAFGUs foster unity and cooperation in mutual efforts among residents of places where they operate and serve as bridge between local populace and the military.

4) Environmental dimension – CAFGUs help in curbing down illegal logging operation, poaching and trading of endangered indigenous animal species and natural resources.

5) Economic dimension – CAFGUs could be partners of the government in various economic ventures and livelihood projects.


Available at: www.coav.org.br/publique/cgi/cgilua.exe/sys/start.htm?infoid=1268&sid=100&UserActiveTemplate=_en

This report is part of an international project called the Children in Organised Armed Violence (COAV) coordinated by the Brazilian NGO Viva Rio and the International Action Net on Small Arms. COAV are defined as “any person under the age of 18 who is employed or otherwise participates in organized armed violence, where there are elements of a command structure and power over territory, local population or
resources.” This working definition sets COAV apart from child soldiers and children in conflict with the law.

The Philippines component of this study deals with the recruitment of under-age youth into CVO’s. The involvement of children and youth in CVOs used as private armies is regarded as a devastating consequence of a number of factors including the proliferation of small arms; the decades-old insurgency; the practice of *rido* as a means to settle disputes; as well as a culture equating gun ownership with religious and cultural heritage.

The study focused on three municipalities in the province of Maguindanao, which are not named for security reasons. The three municipalities were chosen because of reported cases of children joining the CVOs. The report undertakes a comprehensive analysis of the historical evolution of CVO’s in the region and explains the important role played by the religiously sanctioned feudal Datu system. Datu is a Moro term for local chieftain and the title is acquired through inheritance. A Datu may control a community and his followers owe reverence to him because of his autocratic leadership. Family feud or *rido*, as it is called locally among the Moro people of Mindanao, is often sparked by a rival Datus (chieftains) who wants control over a community, resources, wealth and dominance in politics.

The research examines the linkages between clan loyalty, the use of violence to capture political power and the creation of private armies. The process of recruitment into CVOs and the duties they usually undertake is also explained using individual testimonies. The study also points out that almost all the weapons of the CVO’s are provided by the army or local political leaders.

Particularly in the case of youth, joining a CVO is often necessary for survival, either on account of livelihood pressure or because refusal to join could mean violence being perpetuated against them. Despite the danger of violence, in the context of poverty and lack of education, many youth—overwhelmingly male—feel that joining a CVO is their best option. The report notes that young recruits are often not fully aware of the illegal activities of CVOs and private armies when they first join. The study suggests that more attention needs to be drawn to the issue of children and young people being used in CVOs. It also calls for stricter implementation of existing provisions on CVO recruitment which explicitly state that only individuals above the age of 18 are eligible.

This study provides a detailed overview of the CVO system and its linkages to local tradition, business rivalry, political rivalry and the insurgency. Its focus however is mainly on the issue of children conscription in the CVOs and not among other militia groups in Maguindanao.

**Commission on Human Rights, (2000), On the revival of the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs ).**

**Available at:**
www.chr.gov.ph/MAIN%20PAGES/about%20hr/advisories/pdf_files/abthr009.pdf

This one page advisory is issued by the Philippines Commission on Human Rights (CHR) and essentially provides a policy position. It was a reaction to the revival of the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) by the government, as a measure to counter the increasing incidents of violence committed by rebel groups.
While acknowledging that the overall motive of government is laudable, the CHR notes its concern regarding the violations of human rights associated with such groups.

The advisory makes reference to the International Covenant on Civil and Political and particular clauses. It also notes that according to CHR records, about 853 cases consisting of murder, execution, torture, disappearance, illegal arrest, and detention were filed with the CHR against 1,070 CAFGU members. It urges the same standard of training for the CAFGU’s as required by the military and police. It also calls for CAFGUs to be subject to disciplinary action for abuses.

The Commission on Human Rights is an independent office created by the Constitution of the Philippines, with the primary function of investigating all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights in the Philippines. It originated from the Presidential Committee on Human Rights established in 1986. It is composed of a Chairperson and four members. Under Section 18, Article XIII of the Philippine Constitution, the Commission is empowered to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights, adopt rules of procedure and issue contempt citations, provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, and several other powers in relation to the protection of human rights.

Concepción, Sylvia, Larry Digal, Ruffa Guiam, Romulo de la Rosa, and Mara Stankovitch (2003), Breaking the links between economics and conflict in Mindanao, Discussion paper at the ‘Waging Peace’ Conference, Manila, December.

Available at: www.internationalalert.org/pdfs/economics_and_conflict_in_mindanao.pdf

This discussion paper by the Business and Conflict Programme of International Alert examines the complex linkages between economic factors and violent conflict in Mindanao. Competition for natural resources (particularly land) has been crucial in the escalation of armed violence, and economic exclusion has fed alienation from the Philippine state. It also tries to assess the economic impact of the conflict on the region and describes how the private sector could play a constructive role in bringing peace. In the process, it makes a number of observations regarding small arms proliferation and private civilian armed groups.

The perceived need for security is cited as a major reason for people to possess firearms. There is a booming gun running business in Mindanao and the article, citing the Philippine National Police (PNP), attributes this to the prospect of huge profits, connivance among gun running syndicates, encouraged by corrupt law enforcement efforts; persistent involvement of political families and other influential people who want to beef up their private armies; a ‘yearning for guns’—for status as well as security and the persistence of violent family/clan feuds, among families wealthy enough to afford weapons. The main routes for gunrunning are mentioned and limited effect of ‘return the gun programmes’ are described. The paper also offers a good overview of the peace process under different administrations.

The creation of civilian armed groups by government forces or companies to protect economic infrastructure or businesses is also mentioned. Large areas of south-west
Mindanao have been abandoned to lawlessness, so that local communities, and also businesses are insecure. There is a proliferation of armed groups, in some cases ‘lost commandos’ who once fought for one or other of the warring parties, but who now operate outside any external control. Added to this are the civilian ‘volunteers’ armed by the military over the years to fight perceived supporters of the Moro armed groups and the New People’s Army (NPA). Civilian volunteers can use their weapons in pursuit of gain, or in localised resource conflicts. Efforts by government forces or companies to protect economic infrastructure or businesses usually take the form of employing an armed force.

Larger businesses in rural areas may employ Special Civilian Armed Auxiliary (SCAA), which is called by the local popular name as Special CAFGUs because of a special arrangement entered into between the Philippine Army and owners of business establishments that requested its service. SCAAs’ living allowances are provided by the owners of the business establishments that requested them, which makes it different from the regular CAFGUs (CAA) whose living allowances come from the military. SCAA, however, are still administered, armed and given rudimentary training by the military. These may be used not only against armed groups as in the case of the New Peoples’ Army, but to suppress community opposition to a company’s presence or operations.

In some cases, they adopt harsh security measures and commit human rights violations, provoking further conflict that draws in armed political groups and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). The SCAA is differentiated from the CAFGUs and CVOs by virtue of its focus on protecting the assets of large private companies. SCAA utilisation is primarily for the security and interest of the business company financing it. Private firms provide the budget requirements of SCAA for protecting them.

In its recommendations, the authors argue for a more proactive peacemaking role for the private sector. This is significant as the private sector is a potential key employer of individuals disbanded from CVOs and CAFGUs. The key question is however, the extent to which the private sector can have an impact in the absence of political will.


Available at: [www.lowyinstitute.org/Publication.asp?pid=511](http://www.lowyinstitute.org/Publication.asp?pid=511)

This report is directed at the international community, and presents a strategy to support and encourage a peace agreement between the MILF and the Government of the Philippines. It is based on a detailed analysis of the recent history of the conflict and the key actors involved, and draw upon fieldwork and the extensive experience of the authors in the Philippines.

The paper’s account of the MILF’s internal dynamics is excellent. In a similar vein, the authors carefully disaggregate the different approaches taken by the government, and the mixed motives of major foreign countries with an interest in Mindanao. The authors show a strong awareness of the inter-clan feuds that characterise politics in Mindanao, suggesting that the peace process cannot easily change the region’s
political culture but can minimise its spill-over into violent insurgency and support for foreign terrorists.

Helpful distinctions are drawn between the processes of negotiating with the MILF versus the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). Important differences which might inhibit a peace agreement include the slower pace of talks; higher levels of violence both from military offensives and Jemaah Islamiyah-inspired bombings which in turn strengthen hardliners in the government; and the difficulty of reconciling any agreement with the MILF with commitments made to the MNLF. However, more positive factors include a peace process buttressed by a pre-deal development agenda and stronger interest from foreign governments, provided that such foreign support is well-directed.

Though the authors note that all of the factors that led peace agreements to fail in the past still exist, they suggest that the best chance for a peace deal is if foreign support is directed towards four particular areas:

1. Strengthening the peace process—better funding and expansion of local and international monitoring teams;
2. MILF transformation—successful Islamic parties from S.E. Asia should send representatives to the MILF to encourage them to develop into a formal political party;
3. Development aid—failure to deliver aid in a timely manner undermined earlier peace deals; a deal should benefit Christian Mindanao too to prevent them acting as a spoiler;
4. Military modernisation—help re-orientate the armed forces away from a garrison-based inward posture to more professional, externally oriented units.


The thesis examines the role of paramilitary forces in the counterinsurgency campaign of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) against the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the New People’s Army (NPA). It contends that the present Civilian Armed Force Geographical Unit Active Auxiliary (CAA), known as regular CAFGUs among the military, is an essential component of the AFP’s ‘clear-hold-support’ strategy. CAA differs from the Special CAFGU (SCAA) because its main function is for counterinsurgency while SCAA is used to secure big business establishments in rural areas. The Civilian Volunteer Organisation (CVO) is organized by the Local Government Unit (LGU) and its function is like that of police auxiliary, which is to maintain peace and order in each barangay. Living allowances for CVOs are not fixed in and are disbursed by the LGU that recruited them.

Espino concludes that the Philippine Government and the AFP are correct in continuing with the paramilitary forces as a local security mechanism. However Espino notes that in order to make these militias effective in counterinsurgency if, they need proper training as well as coherent command and control from the AFP.

To improve and enhance the use of militia entities in the counterinsurgency campaign, Espino recommends the organisation of one CAA infantry division in areas of reduced insurgency activity and at least two CAAs in areas of enhanced insurgent activity.
This thesis is useful because it traces the evolution of the Communist Party of the Philippines—New Peoples’ Army (CPP-NPA), which is outlawed and considered by the Philippine Government as a threat to national security. With regard to the CPP-NPA formation, the researcher provided valuable insights, reasons, and justifications for the Philippine Government’s use of CAFGUs to repress insurgency. The researcher traced the historical root of the CAFGUs from its previous antecedents, such as the Barangay Self-Defense Unit (BSDU), Integrated Civilian Home Defense Force (ICHDF), and Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF), and noted the successes and failures of each group.

Its weaknesses however are that the researcher only sought the opinions of the military respondents, and did not take adequate account of the damage to property and loss of human life attributed to militia action. The thesis does not examine how formation of militias led to proliferation of loose firearms in remote barangays, thus further complicating efforts to reduce armed violence.


The study examines the capabilities of military reservists in terms of training and equipment; rendition of duty against insurgency and lawless elements; relevance of services rendered in intelligence information gathering; and in conducting search and rescue operations in natural disasters.

Data were generated through random sampling among 396 respondents who were divided into two categories the first category comprised regular forces utilising military reservists and the second category composed of Army Ready Reserves (ARR). Descriptive statistics and Kruskal-Wallis One Way Analysis of Variance were used in analysing the results.

The response of the military reservists showed that they thought that they were properly trained and equipped with the necessary military skill to maintain peace and order; ready and willing to serve their respective communities; willing to help the regular military forces in case called to active duty; willing to do volunteer work in times of disaster and calamities; and that their role in intelligence information gathering was relevant.

Among the AFP regulars, “search and rescue” was viewed as an important role for the reservists in relation to internal security, and the “socio-economic role” was given the least priority. Training of the reservists was deemed to be adequate; the organisation was seen to be effective and responsive but inadequate in terms of military equipment.

Estabillo concludes that the citizen armed forces of which military reservists and CAFGUs are components was effective in containing insurgency in the Philippines. According to him, reduction in CAFGUs numbers in the 1990s contributed to the relapse of insurgency in previously cleared areas. Hence, he felt that it is prudent that the CAFGUs, be reactivated.
The researcher recommended that the budget allocation for military reservists be increased, and should be drawn from the Local Government Unit (LGU). The enhanced budget should be used for training and buying new equipment.

The paper also contains a wide ranging review of literature on of the Reserved Force (RF) or Citizen Armed Forced (CAF) as enshrined in the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines. The legal framework for the CAF was strengthened by the passing in 1991 of Republic Act 7077 known as AFP Reservist Act, which defines the mission of the Reserved Force in relation to national security. This includes providing the base for expansion of the AFP regular force in the event of war, invasion, and rebellion; assisting in rescue and relief operations during times of calamities and disasters; assisting in the socio-economic development and operation and maintenance of essential government and private utilities.

**Fabros, Colonel Rudy D (2007), Assessing the management and employment of CAFGU in Cagayan Valley and its impact on national security, Master’s Thesis, National Defense College, Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City.**

Using random sampling, the study generated responses from 210 respondents, 90 of whom were military officers and 120 government officials, in assessing the management and employment of CAFGUs in Cagayan Valley, in relation to its role in maintaining national security. Specifically the study examined the following questions. 1) How are CAFGUs managed in relation to organisational set-up, training, control and supervision, and compensation/benefits? 2) How effective are CAFGU units as support partners of the military in intelligence information gathering, combat operations and civil-military operations. 3) What are the perceptions of both AFP officers and local government officials about CAFGU units as force multipliers in fighting against threats to national security? 4) What are the problems besetting CAFGU units that affect their effectiveness in work?

Results revealed the following:

1) Organisational structure is adequate; however there is a need to increase CAFGU force strength from 13 to 21 personnel at the company level in order to provide greater and better security of the barangay;

2) Selection and screening of CAFGU recruits necessitate consultations with the local officials to avoid inclusion of individuals with derogatory records;

3) Trainers responsible for CAFGUs are satisfactory in terms of military technical-know, however, there is shortage of qualified trainers from the Cadre Battalion to handle CAFGU training;

4) CAFGUs are more suited to administrative control under the Philippine Army rather than under the Philippine National Police;

5) CAFGUs receive their subsistence living allowance, combat clothing and individual paraphernalia on time;

6) CAFGUs are very effective in countering insurgency with regard to intelligence gathering and combat operation;
7) CAFGUs are helpful in rescue and relief operations in times of disaster and calamities;

8) There is a shortage of cadre personnel responsible for supervising CAFGUs at the ground level; and,

9) CAFGU lack appropriate communication equipment.

Fabros concludes that CAFGUs are effective as a force multiplier role as a ‘hold-on force’ in areas cleared of insurgency is also key.

For CAFGUs to be more relevant and effective in the discharge of their duties, the following recommendations were made: 1) Financial support for CAFGUs should be increased. 2) Increase the number of personnel in CAFGUs from 13 to 21 cadres in each company. 3) CAFGU program should be harmonized with the Reservist Program of the military in order to draw upon readily mobilised reserved force in time of war. 4) Equal opportunity for enlistment in the regular army force should be made available to CAFGUs. 5) CAFGUs that have shown exemplary performance of duties should be given recognition and awards. 6) CAFGU recruits should pass through proper screening and selection procedures. 7) CAFGUs should be issued proper communication equipment.

The scope of the research is limited. The researcher included only the military officers and local government officials as respondent. He excluded civilians who might have provided impartial feedback on CAFGU performance and administration. Additionally, findings only reflect the situation in the province of Cagayan Valley.

The paper however provides useful insights on the status of the CAFGUs, which could benefit future evaluative research using the same methodology and covering a wider area. The study also offers a wide range of information on the legal basis for the creation of CAFGUs, mandates, roles and benefits.


The paper provides information on the creation of CAFGUs and its role in the government’s campaign against insurgency. Hermoso is a member of the AFP, and from that viewpoint, examines how CAFGUs are organised and recruited.

There have been widespread public concerns about the CAFGUs, mostly on account of human rights abuses committed by its predecessors – the Civilian Home Defense Unit (CHDF). There are no proper safeguards in place to prevent abusive individuals from joining the CAFGUs. Often, military personnel collude with local government officials when recruiting for CAFGUs and ignore relevant criteria. The training of new recruits is often haphazard and inadequate.

Hermoso says that the CAFGUs will not commit the same offences as the CHDF on account of close supervision by the military. Additionally he notes that careful recruitment and screening procedures have been introduced, training has been improved and living allowances and benefits have been increased. Hermoso defends the importance of CAFGUs as key actors of the AFP in insurgency operations.
This paper responds to many issues raised by critics of CAFGUs, and at the same time, admits to some of its weaknesses and areas that need improvement. However the paper fails to analyse in depth, the importance of policies relating to recruitment, screening, training, supervision and administration of CAFGUs.


This is an excellent study of how violence in southern Philippines is linked to clans and their struggle for political control. This report argues that violence in Mindanao is derived mainly from the interplay between local cultural models of order and social practices, which, along the dynamics of the civil war and the formal democratic setting in which Philippine politics takes place, leads to a violence-laden local order. As agents of violence, clans and political families can use the civil war in many ways, effectively masking their political dealings as civil war violence. In the local political arena, it is vitally important to be able to characterise one’s own forces as ‘state’ but those of rival clans as ‘rebels’, which can then be criminalised. In many conflicts, being able count on the help of one of the two conflicting parties—guerrilla or military or police—can be crucial. This is ensured by either corrupting the party or infiltrating them with members of one’s own clan. The result is a large number of smaller or larger private armies, which, legitimised through state uniforms, stand de facto in the service of a family. This masking ‘strategy’ also facilitates better weaponry and a widening of the means of private violence.

In addition to the state security forces, the militia and fighters of the MILF, the agents of violence also include the powerful local clans and a number of strongmen with their private armies and gangs of thugs, who appear to have excellent connections with politicians, as well as possibly with the MILF guerrillas. To this could be added different forms of ethnic or religious militias, which, originally set up by the armed forces, are now more or less autonomous in their decision-making with regard to violent acts.

This study locates the use of CVOs and private armies within the broader political and social context in Philippines. An important point made in this regard is that violence remains an important resource in the fight for political power, especially at the local level – and this is no different for Mindanao than for many other regions of the Philippines.

However, the Muslim south stands out because of additional, violence-shaping, form-giving resources derived from the civil war, and the counter-identity of the Moros.

The civil war can therefore be seen to represent an enabling structure which allows opportunistic actors to use its frame and potential of legitimate violence to satisfy their own interests. Good contacts with the guerrillas or the military, and the authority to use the services of the large numbers of CAFGUs or police units, serve as an additional resource for the promotion of the interests of the clans. This not only escalates clan violence, but also leads to its masking behind the facade of the violence between the guerrillas and military. This paper is very useful for practitioners and policymakers working in the area and seeking a fine grained overview of militia formations.

This publication is part of a series of reports on human rights violations in the Philippines perpetrated by the CAFGUs. Information was gathered in 1989, and it primarily examines human rights violations committed by CAFGUs and vigilante groups. The report also examines violations of international humanitarian law by NPA insurgents.

Whilst out of date, the report’s findings still have resonance in 2010. The report documents human rights abuses by the military and by paramilitary groups including the killing, torture, and illegal arrest of individuals. The NPA, too, is shown to have violated international humanitarian law, including carrying out assassinations, extortion and implementing its version of “justice” in areas under its control.

The Lawyers Committee concluded that the CAFGU forces and vigilante groups have committed serious violations of human rights throughout the Philippines, many of which are related to the infectiveness and reach of government services, compounded by the poor regulation of recruitment, screening, training and supervision. These problems are exacerbated by the inadequacy of government to penalise or prosecute CAFGU offenders.


Available at: www.international.gc.ca/armsarmes/assets/pdfs/makinano_lubang2001.pdf

This study was commissioned by the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. In an attempt to analyse the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) experience of Mindanao, this study delves into the historical background of the conflict and the reality of weapons availability, including government efforts to curb the proliferation of firearms, and the negotiations for peace. It also examines the economic and cultural reasons for the high rate of gun ownership in the region. A considerable part of the study is focussed on examining the experience with demobilisation and reintegration of Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) fighters.

However, it is surprising that in the context of firearms proliferation, the study only makes a brief reference to the role of private armies and politicians. It notes that according to the PNP, one of the major reasons for proliferation of firearms in Mindanao is “the persistent involvement of political families and other influential personalities either to beef up their private armies or as instruments in the conduct of their nefarious activities” (p 21). Despite this gap, it provides other useful background pertinent to a focus on militias, and is therefore included in this review.

This study also indicates the variety of terminology used to describe non-state armed entities. The authors use the term, Partisan Armed Groups (PAGs) and assert that according to the PNP’s Intelligence Directorate, a PAG is an organised group of more than 3 persons with legally issued or illegally possessed firearms, utilised in the
conduct of criminal and/or oppressive acts, primarily for the advancement and protection of the vested political and economic interests of a public official or private individual. This definition excludes groups that are purely criminal in nature. In its conclusion, the study makes the useful recommendation that efforts must be made to change the perception of people towards guns and violence though education and enlisting the support of religious leaders.

While the cultural and political complexity behind violence in Mindanao is addressed in this study, it examines DDR issues primarily through the lens of the separatist conflict. In this regard, it is important to note that other armed entities including semi-official militias and private political armies also need to be brought under the purview of DDR policies for long term peace and stability. Additionally, the emphasis on the Muslim culture encouraging gun ownership overlooks the fact that small arms proliferation and non-state armed activity connected to economics and politics is not confined to the Mindanao region of the Philippines.

May, Ronald J (1992), Vigilantes in the Philippines: From fanatical cults to citizens’ organizations, Occasional Paper No. 12, Centre for Philippine Studies, School of Hawaiian, Asian and Pacific Studies, University of Hawaii.

The study comprises three parts. Part one focuses on vigilante groups during the colonial era in the Philippines. During the Spanish colonial period, paramilitary forces were used to maintain the tenuous grip of the small European population with the native inhabitants. Wealthy landowners and government officials maintained their own private armies to intimidate tenants, break strikes, and deliver the votes. Civilian guards were used by the Philippine Constabulary (PC) in 1948 as their “eyes and ears” in counterinsurgency programme against the Huks, now the New Peoples’ Army (NPA) whose members are fighting for equitable distribution of the country’s wealth and resources.

Part two reflects on the history of vigilantism after the declaration of Martial Law in the Philippines in 1972. During the Marcos regime, the threat of left-wing insurgency led to the revival of what was then called Barangay Self-Defense Unit (BSDU). BSDU was renamed later to Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF) because of widespread public complaints about abuses they committed to civilians. During the administration of President Ramos CHDF was changed to another name – the Integrated Civilian Home Defense Force (ICHDF) whose memberships and functions were essentially the same as that of its predecessor. Vigilantes during the years when Marcos was the president were associated with landowners, business tycoons, and influential politicians who recruited individuals, and armed them to protect their business interests. Some vigilantes were formed to help in the counterinsurgency program of the government; others to combat crimes, and help the military in its fight against the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).

Part three is on the rise of vigilantism, which traces the upsurge of vigilante groups’ formation in the Philippines, starting in early 1987 when there was a breakdown in the negotiation and reconciliation efforts between the Philippine government and the NPA during the Aquino administration. By late 1987, the study reported some 200 vigilante forces across the country, many of them operating in Mindanao. The army supported the formation of vigilantes as part of its counterinsurgency program against the former MNLF (the MILF) and the New People’s Army.
The study, whilst slightly outdated, is useful in understanding the seriousness of the militia issue, especially during the Marcos and Aquino administrations. It helpfully examines some of the key dimensions to the vigilante phenomenon; including social, political, cultural, and religious factors. The research is important in understanding Philippine political anthropology in relation to militia formation.

Moro Islamic Liberation Front (2009), *General situation of Bangsamoro in Mindanao, South of the Philippines and the status of the peace talks between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines as of April 2009, A report presented during the meeting of the intergovernmental groups of experts representing their respective states under the auspices of the Department of Minorities and Muslim Affairs of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.*

This report presented the general Moro situation and the status of the GRP-MILF peace talks, and the seven-point appeal of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front to the Organization of Islamic Conference.

It also contains a consolidated report of fighting between the Philippine government and MILF forces in the provinces of Maguindanao, North Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat and Sarangani from 1 July 2008 to 29 March 2009. In more than half of the 111 encounters between the government and MILF forces listed in the report, CAFGU and the CVO were involved.

The report provides brief insights into the extent to which militia are used in combat and to perpetrate armed violence more generally.


Available at: http://humansecurityconf.polsci.chula.ac.th/Documents/Presentations/Jasmin.pdf

This report draws on feedback received from a series of ‘peoples’ consultations’ conducted by the Philippine Action Network on Small Arms (PhilANSA) to determine, among other things, the causes and effects of gun violence in the country. Focus group discussions were conducted with ordinary people affected by armed violence all over the Philippines including Zamboanga and Cotabato in the Mindanao region. These discussions, as well as survey results, indicated that sources of gun violence in the Philippines are three fold: politically motivated, connected to crime and driven by armed conflicts. Numerous lives in the country have been felled by bullets because of political rivalries. Many political dynasties have hired private armies or bodyguards who have helped seal their place in the political echelon. Economics and easy access to guns have also been largely identified as causes of gun violence.

The report states that guns help sustain armed conflicts, and facilitate the violation of human rights. They are tools, and effective at that, in threatening the country’s political security. Participants also pointed to conflicts involving groups as sources of gun violence. Dispute over resources was also pointed to by the FGD participants as a source of gun violence. Participants also claimed that not only illegal, but also legal
guns are used to harass and threaten civilians. The use of military and police by landlords to harass civilians, and the abuses of personnel in uniform were mentioned by a score of participants. The report states that guns have become tools to perpetuate a cycle of violence, both direct and structural, promoting insecurity among the population.

This report provides helpful detail on factors driving armed violence in the country, and is therefore a useful complement to those concerned with militias, and provides a ‘snapshot’ of what some citizens’ think about these issues.

**Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, (no date), *Cadre commanders handbook: The silent heroes in the battle for the barangays, Armed Forces of the Philippines, Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City.***

The purpose of the handbook is to enhance the working knowledge of cadre unit commanders and personnel of the AFP involved in handling the operations and administration of the Citizen Armed force Geographical Unit Active Auxiliary (CAA) and Special Citizen Armed Force Geographical Unit Active Auxiliary (SCAA). It explains the ‘integrated territorial defence system’ (ITDS) of implementing the ‘clear-hold-consolidate-develop’ (C-H-C-D) strategy in addressing insurgency. The roles of CAFGU and CVO in implementing ITDS are highlighted in this handbook.

The handbook also explains the administrative policies and procedures that military handlers of CAA/SCAA have to follow in screening and selection, personnel documentation and accounting system, and allowances and benefits of CAAs and SCAAs. The operational policies and procedures include the requirements for CAA/SCAA activation and deactivation, training, and deployment and utilisation. A separate chapter deals with the concept of cadre battalion, a unit dedicated to cater to the administrative and operational needs of CAAs and SCAAs. The purpose of this concept is to free the manoeuvre battalions of the regular forces from holding a territory and concentrate in clearing functions. Holding territory becomes the responsibility of the CAAs and SCAAs under the operational supervision of cadre battalion. The handbook explains the operational control of the battalion commander over discipline, training requirements, and resource management.

**Patino, Patrick and Velasco, Djoirina (2004), *Election Violence in the Philippines,* Online Papers, Friedch Ebert Stiftung.**

Available at: http://www.fes.org.ph/papers_elecviolence.htm

This report, published by the German foundation Friedch Ebert Stiftung, considers data on election-related violence and its causes. The use of private armies and their links to the security services is therefore explored. Patino and Velasco note that politicians usually hire ‘goons’ and build up private armies for their protection as well as to intimidate opponents. According to military reports from 2001, that they cite, some 100 private armies were behind about 80 per cent of election-related violence.

The report goes on to explain that goons and private armies usually come from various backgrounds, although many initially began their “career” as security guards or policemen assigned to the politician. Others are former military or police personnel who had gone absent without official leave due to involvement in crime, and who subsequently attach themselves to local politicians for mutual protection. In some cases, private armies include local community leaders with dubious reputations who
are feared in the community. These leaders are hired to consolidate a candidate’s electoral base by bullying supporters of rival candidates. The report points out that in many areas, one cannot be a politician without an arsenal. A politician’s stature is dependent on the number of guns in his or her possession and the armed men in his or her control. In these localities, control of the means of violence legitimizes political power.

In its recommendations, the report calls for the strengthening of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), the agency constitutionally mandated to administer the conduct of elections. According to the report, under the administrations of Corazon Aquino and Fidel V Ramos, the COMELEC did strongly enforce election laws and introduced innovative ways to combat violence including the restriction and disarming of civilian militias, government-assigned bodyguards as well as partisan military personnel.

While the report does mention the MILF, MNLF and NPA as contributing to electoral violence, this issue could have been examined in more detail. Additionally, while the report calls for stricter action by the COMELEC on civilian militias, a more sustainable solution would be to undertake large scale reform of the governance and security sphere rather than concentrated action ahead of an election.


Available at: www.uni-marburg.de/konfliktforschung/aktheorie/pdf-zweiter-Workshop/MacaspacPenetrante-FragileStates

This is a well considered paper analysing the effects of weapons availability on political culture and governance structures in the Philippines. It also articulates the effects of a related issue, which is the rise of organised civilian armed groups and private military companies. The paper details the revival of militias by the Arroyo administration and the role of CAFGUs. The author is of the opinion that a significant risk is involved in the funding of such formations through municipal and provincial governments, boosting their control of force in their territory.

The Barangay Defence System (BDS) is also investigated. Penetrante notes that statistics seem to indicate that executions are more likely in barangays with BDS, despite conflicting reports on whether the BDS are armed. While it seems that the AFP has no general practice of providing the BDS arms, some of these units get arms from other sources. The paper explores the distinction between Partisan Armed Groups (PAGs) and Private Military Firms (PMFs), which are hallmarks of the growing privatisation of security in the country. In the Philippines, PMFs and PAGs are seen as legitimate and necessary by the majority of the citizens. Although, it can also be concluded, that many citizens have become desensitised to the presence of heavily armed PMF guards in restaurants, banks, schools, hospitals, theatres, cinemas, subdivisions or gated residential communities, shopping malls and in public buildings.

Penetrante contends that the Philippine state is effectively diminishing its monopoly on the legitimate use of force. The maintenance of private armies through local politicians ensures their hold of the power, and the control of the local resources, thus,
decreasing their dependence on the national government. The maintenance of private armies by the business elite is another dimension of the problem, with the hiring of outfits with weapons more sophisticated than the military and police.

The paper concludes that the fragility of the Philippine state is not the primary reason for the high saturation of weapons and deeply rooted gun culture, but rather, because of poor governance resulting in fragility, the state is overstrained with high saturation of weapons. In fragile states, even a low level of arms acquisition may be sufficient to spark an arms race between groups, as the state is not seen as competent to neutralize the security dilemma existing between them.

**Philippine Human Rights Information Center (1993), CAFGUs against human rights, Manila, March.**

This study, aimed primarily at the human rights community, traces the creation of the CAFGUs during the Ramos Administration, which replaced the earlier militia known as the Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF), and discusses the constitutional basis of its formation. According to the Center or PhilRights as it is also known, there are doubts as to the constitutionality of the creation of the CAFGUs, and the argument is laid out in the paper. It argues that safeguards for ensuring the discipline of the CAFGUs, as announced by President Ramos, has not worked and in fact, has been widely disregarded. Despite the age of this report, these observations still carry weight in 2010.

PhilRights asserts that some 70 per cent of CAFGU membership was recruited from among former CHDFs, rightwing vigilantes, private armies or other paramilitary forces outlawed under the transitory provisions of the 1987 Constitution. The need to rapidly beef up CAFGUs forces in line with military targets and operations led to the setting aside of screening requirements based on qualification, proper training and motivation.

PhilRights cited cases of human rights violations committed by CAFGUs during the study period related to arrest and detention, disappearance, murder, physical assault, harassment, evacuation, divestment of property, destruction of property and fake surrenders. The conclusion notes that maintenance and expansion of the CAFGUs remains one of the main thrusts of the AFP for the years ahead (in 1993), given the inexpensive ‘tool’ militias represent in the counterinsurgency effort. The report catalogues evidence about their role in the counterinsurgency program being undermined by the human rights violations and damage to rural communities. This paper highlights some of the arguments against the continuance of CAFGUs as far back as 1993.

**Pobre, Cesar P and Quilop, Raymund Jose G (Editors) (2008), In Assertion of sovereignty: The 2000 campaign against the MILF, Office of Strategic and Special Studies, Armed Forces of the Philippines, Quezon City.**

This book is an explanation of what transpired during the military campaign of the AFP against the MILF in year 2000. It is an improvement of an earlier manuscript written through the collaborative efforts of various offices in the AFP, later improved by the Joint Study Group on the Lessons from AFP Operations against the MILF. Unsurprisingly the publication is constrained in its analysis being an official army document intended for a primarily a military readership.
However the book is interesting as it details the CAFGUs that were involved in the military campaign against the MILF. For the purpose of the military operations, 24,618 CAFGU Active Auxiliaries were organised into 387 companies and deployed in the areas of responsibility of the three infantry divisions in Mindanao.


Available at: www.wds.worldbank.org/servlet/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&entityID=000112742_20060726173328

This World Bank study seeks to examine how young males have been affected by the conflict in Mindanao. This is vital given the disproportionate involvement of young men in armed violence in the Philippines, (and in general the world). The study notes many development projects, in an attempt to be gender sensitive, are in fact solely women-oriented and tend to ignore male youth, with young men viewed predominantly as perpetrators of violence. The study carefully observes that many young men in fact do not involve themselves in violence and understanding how this is possible in contexts where armed violence is a norm, is crucial for policymaking.

In terms of methodology, the study usefully examines seven provinces in four out of the six regions in Mindanao, and the research was based on qualitative data collection, including focus group discussions.

At a substantive level, it reports how the environment in which the youth of Mindanao grow up is shaped by militarism, guns and violence. Guns are often seen as the means of power, and association with violence, especially *rido* has positive social connotations from the peer group. In addition, often young men have no choice but to take up arms given the prevailing lack of security and chronic lack of livelihood options. In addition, focus group discussions noted that the presence of a large number of armed groups and the easy availability of arms and ammunition are two major factors that have a bearing on their physical security. The study calls for more concentrated action by government, development agencies and civil society targeting the specific needs of young males in Mindanao. It also highlights the importance of dealing with the psychosocial impacts suffered by youth due to growing up in a conflict environment.

An interesting point mentioned in the report is that the overwhelming majority of young men who participated in the study expressed a fatalism of sorts, stating that they cannot do much to improve safety and security, and it is the task of the national and local governments to ensure their safety.

Essentially this report seeks to highlight the fact that youth should not be seen just as perpetrators of violence in the Mindanao conflict. At the same time, many of the recommendations made in the report require a stable post-war environment to be effective. The issue of armed civilian volunteer organisations is also not fully explored, despite many youth being drafted into such entities.

Available at: 

This publication provides statistics including information on the yearly strength of CAFGU Active Auxiliary from year 1988 to 2005, and their deployment in different infantry divisions of the Philippine Army. A breakdown on the deployment is also given as presented here. The CAFGU units are presently deployed in at least 13,400 villages in the Philippines, 70% of which are in Central Mindanao and 30% in other areas of the country where insurgency has been an endemic threat.

CAFGU’s force strength from 1988 to 2005 is presented hereafter. The source of the data is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, G3, Headquarters of the Philippine Army.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>CAFGU Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>37,360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>49,721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>69,747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>68,211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>75,461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>67,691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>55,581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>37,178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>36,326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>33,716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>32,748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>32,748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>32,748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>41,979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>51,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>52,220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>52,748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>52,748</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CAFGUs have been associated with local private armies of local politicians. The AFP resents this view and counters it by arguing that the CAFGUs are part of the military hierarchy and not a private army.


This a policy option paper which is focused on the effective command and control, and training (C2T) development of Army reservists in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act (RA) 7077 and RA 7898, known as Reservist Law and AFP Modernization Law, respectively.
Sec 3, RA 7077 provides that reservists shall be afforded maximum opportunity to participate in safeguarding the security of the state and in assisting socio-economic development. Sec 4, RA 7077 provides for the organisation, development and maintenance, training/activities to ensure the reservists’ readiness to immediately respond to the call of the service. Sec 2, RA 7898 provides for the development of a self-reliant, credible strategic reserve force.

The key questions examined in this study are: “What unit can best provide effective command, control, and training (C2T) for Army reservists and what policies should be adopted towards enhancing its capability to accomplish its mission?”

Four objectives were laid down, such as to: 1) assess the capability of the Reserve Command (RESCOM) in addressing its mission to provide C2T function to the reservist; 2) determine and assess other Army units with the capability and mandate related to reservist affairs that can serve as a replacement to perform effective reservist C2T; 3) formulate policy options that will enhance unit capability to accomplish its C2T mission effectively and that will also develop the capability of the reservists to perform their multi-role functions; and 4) determine the implications of the proposed policy measures on national security.

The study used descriptive analytical-evaluative type of research. Data was generated through exploratory techniques using original documents, previous studies, focused interviews and surveys. Comparative analysis was conducted among alternative selected units based on missions, capabilities, organisations, significant accomplishments and assessment, as follows: 1) Reserve Command (RESCOM), the incumbent unit for reservists’ development and administration; 2) Infantry Brigade (Separate), the future territorial unit primarily for reservist development and specifically to provide C2T functions to reservists during their integration in the active army; 3) Special Forces Regiment (SFRA) of the Airborne, which serves as trainer, operator and force multiplier to both active and reserve forces; 4) First Scout Ranger Regiment (FSRR), considered the best manoeuvre unit of the AFP; and 5) Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), the premier training institution of the Philippine Army (PA) dubbed as “The Professionals.”

Results showed that TRADOC and FSRR do not possess the attributes needed for C2T role. TRADOC is limited to training mission primarily for the active force with no command and control capability. FSSR has C2T capability but limited to combat role only. It lacks the development role essential for the training of reservists. Respondents’ preference was 9 per cent for TRADOC and 8 per cent for FSRR.

Based on the results, the researcher forwarded three policy options as discussed hereafter. Option 1 – Maintain Status Quo. RESCOM, with its existing capability and enhancement programs for growth and modernization, shall continue to maintain the reservist training which includes their integration in the regular force for command and control. Option 2 – Infantry Brigade (Separate) shall provide the training, command and control functions of the reservists during their integration in the active Army and continue its role in times of crisis or war, to address national security and development. Option 3 – SFRA shall provide C2T function to all RRU units to include those earmarked for integration in the regular force. The role includes training and operation management in the areas of organisation, maintenance, specialization
and mobilization of reserve units. Comparative analysis based on unit attributes showed Option 3 as the preferred one over the other two options.

The research provided intensive reviews on the concept and practices of military reservists in the Philippines and is an excellent source of information.

Santos, Soliman M (2005), *Evolution of the armed conflict on the Moro front, Human Development Network Foundation.*

The paper explores the historical evolution of the conflict in Mindanao, purportedly through a human security and development frame.

Starting with the conflict’s historical roots, the article traces the evolution of the Moro movement from 1968, through the signing of the 1976 Tripoli agreement, the split between the MNLF and MILF in 1984, and the establishment in 1987 of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The author is critical both of the government’s failure to faithfully implement the Tripoli agreement and the lack of consultation with Moro groups over the shape and form of the ARMM. His criticism is also directed towards the government’s lack of policy coherence which he characterises as flitting between military offensives and negotiations.

The paper separates out three strands of the conflict: the implementation of the Government-MNLF Peace Agreement; the Government-MILF peace negotiations; and Post-9/11 Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, focusing on the Abu Sayyaf. The history of each strand is explored chronologically and anecdotally rather than thematically. The dynamics between the MNLF, MILF, and Abu Sayyaf are not explored in significant detail.

The paper proposes focusing on negotiations with the MILF to advance peace in Mindanao, presenting an optimistic perspective on relations between MILF and the Government. The author points to MILF’s policy statement rejecting terrorism, its agreement to cooperate with the government on combating criminal gangs, and cooperation with the army in counter-terrorism operations. He also suggests a renewed focus on building unity, or at least a stronger interface, between MILF and the MNLF.

This paper is valuable background reading to appreciate the extent of militarism and armed violence in Mindanao.


This study by a Philippines law enforcement official assesses the effectiveness of CVOs in handling the following activities: information dissemination, community relations, police-civilian intelligence activities and integration of the CVO in the community. Expectedly, it does not examine the allegations of abuse by the CVO’s and fails to critically analyse roles, impacts and value of such militia groups.

Survey questionnaires which were distributed at random among residents of Pasay City, Metro Manila, were used in gathering data. Descriptive statistics was used in the analysis of the data and in describing the results. The study’s finding revealed the
effectiveness of the CVOs in providing services in the barangays of Pasay City in relation to:

1) Information drive about the government’s development programs in the community,

2) police-civilian intelligence role in gathering information about organized and non-organized crimes, and,

3) Integration of CVO in the community as police auxiliary law enforcers.

The researcher however stated that the results of the evaluation was on the level of being “effective” only and concluded that the auxiliary services of the CVO were not fully effective (very effective) in its implementation as reflected by the differing views and opinions among the respondents of the study. The recommendations of the researcher are that CVO in Pasay City should link with other offices of the national government in order to tap funding and information for their activities; their managerial and technical skills should be strengthened, developed and enhanced through seminars; and private organisations should be tapped to adopt socio-civic projects undertaken in the locality.


Available at: www.yonip.com/main/articles/DEVELOPING%20A%20CULTURE%20OF%20PEACE%20FOR%20SULU%20Final%20Report.pdf

This is a comprehensive study of the human security situation in Sulu including governance, religion, economy, and security. The destabilising role of small arms finds repeated mention and the need for security sector reform is put forward. The report also presents the findings of a survey conducted in all 18 municipalities of Sulu province to determine people’s perception of their situation. This survey is useful in terms of substance and methodology for any future research on armed violence in Sulu. The report presents the historical context, views of Sulu inhabitants, recent developments, and recommendations to deal with problems identified.

The report also explains how elements of the MNLF were co-opted by the local government by bringing them into the local political structure. Thus, a new political elite was created which was armed by the government to support it against secessionist groups. Once armed though, it was difficult to draw the line between the use of these arms for the anti-secessionist fight and its use in the pursuit of political and other personal objectives of the politicians concerned.

In the context of highlighting the potential role of leadership in undertaking violence reduction initiatives in Sulu, the report mentions how a former governor managed to enforce a weapons ban in the metro Jolo area by ensuring that he complied with the directive himself.

However, it is surprising the report fails to analyse or highlight the role of civilian volunteer organisations groups in its survey.

The book is among the most comprehensive and informative resources on *rido* in Mindanao and represents the result of painstaking detailed research. This edited collection brings together coordinated studies on *rido*, the feuding between families and clan characterised by sporadic outbursts of retaliatory violence between families and kinship groups.

The findings are manifold and include the various forms of suffering to families or clan involved in the conflict; that the triggers to *rido* can range from petty to more serious crimes; and aggravating factors include formation of alliances by the principal with other families, proliferation of firearms, lack of effective law enforcement, and an inefficient justice system. Membership of family members with the CAFGUs and CVOs also exacerbate *rido*.

The book recommends government and military leaders to recognise and enhance support for the development of mixed institutions or systems composed of formal and informal structures that can be used in managing and resolving conflicts. To the community leaders and conflict resolution groups, it recommends building the capacity of recognised and potential leaders as well as mediators to more effectively manage conflict; and establishing networks of community based, community initiated conflict monitoring and rapid response mechanisms that will help in the resolution of ongoing *rido*, and prevent the escalation of smaller conflicts.


The paper examines a five year demobilization plan for CAFGUs. The plan was laid out under the covert name “*Oplan Diaspora*” and, if carried out successfully, sixty-two thousand eight hundred thirty CAFGU Active Auxiliaries should have been affected. Based on surveys conducted in Regions V, X and XI, there is a need to adopt adequate and appropriate measures to effectively integrate CAAs into the mainstream of the society to prevent economic upheaval.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Existing CAFGU Forces</th>
<th>Proposed Reduction</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>65,836</td>
<td>7,385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>58,451</td>
<td>11,077</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>47,374</td>
<td>16,652</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>30,722</td>
<td>10,722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Philippine Army Headquarter, Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City

The objective of this research was to assess the phase out plan, formulate and recommend possible options for CAAs that are to be demobilized, and institute appropriate measures to prevent human rights abuses during the phase out period. Respondents were CAAs in Regions V, X, and XI. Results showed that CAAs met only minimum educational qualifications and possessed limited marketable skills. The majority had no other means of livelihood, and relied solely on their living allowances.
for subsistence. CAAs had undergone training covering subjects such as military laws and discipline, CAA organisation, civil relations, and basic legal concepts and doctrines. However, their training was not conducted on a regular basis as provided for under the implementing guidelines of Executive order No.264. The employment of CAAs as personal aides of local government executives, contravenes the law as embodied in the above Executive order.

The paper came up with three possible options for demobilized CAAs:

1. The integration of deserving CAAs into the regular or reserve force of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
2. The absorption of the deserving CAAs into the Philippine National Police.
3. The provision of livelihood training and placement assistance for the CAAs who will be demobilized, in coordination with the national and local government agencies.

In the final analysis of the recommended options, the first two options were found not feasible owing to the AFP’s plan to decrease its manpower strength to 39% and the stringent membership qualification requirements of the Philippine National Police. Option 3, to help demobilized CAFGUs integrate economically in the community, is the most feasible. However, up until the time that the study was conducted in 2000, there had not been any substantial proposal made on livelihood programmes that could help demobilized CAFGUs, because the military opposed the demobilization plan on account of the insurgency problem.

The paper proposed the inclusions of the following amendments in the Oplan Diaspora.

1. Criteria for those who are entitled to separation gratuity in accordance with the Department of National Defense (DND)-Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Circular No. 12 dated 7 March 1994 must be incorporated.

2. Viable and suitable livelihood projects must be identified for effective implementation by area commanders.

3. Government agencies and non-government organisations, which can assist the AFP in providing job placements for demobilized CAFGUs, must also be identified in order to establish official linkages at the highest levels. Thus, a memorandum of Agreement can be entered into between and among these agencies for closer coordination and effective access to services.