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*UN sanctions and
peace negotiations:
possibilities
for complementarity*

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with the assistance of
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UN sanctions and peace negotiations: possibilities for complementarity

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¹ *Much of the material incorporated in this paper draws on previous collaborative research, including *The Effectiveness of UN Targeted Sanctions*, by Thomas Biersteker, Sue Eckert, Marcos Tourinho, and Zuzana Hudáková (Geneva: Graduate Institute, November 2013) and a book manuscript, *Targeting Sanctions: The Impacts and Effectiveness of UN Action* (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2015), edited by Thomas Biersteker, Sue Eckert and Marcos Tourinho.*

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Introduction

The UN Security Council has imposed sanctions in 23 different conflict situations since 1991, but never without simultaneously employing other policy instruments – most often in combination with peace negotiations (97% of the time). While there are a number of reasons to expect that sanctions might complicate peace mediation efforts, mediation processes and sanctions are not inherently contradictory. This paper explores the relationship between UN sanctions and peace mediation efforts, arguing that although examples of complementarity generally remain the exception, there are instances in which sanctions contribute positively to reaching a ceasefire, negotiating peace agreements, maintaining peace settlements, and achieving peacebuilding goals. The paper concludes with some recommendations on ways to improve the coordination between the two policy instruments.

The UN is not alone in the application of sanctions. The European Union (EU) has employed sanctions even more frequently (35 times) since the end of the Cold War for many of the same goals and purposes.² However, sanctions' use is not limited to European and Western-dominated institutions. Other regional organisations have

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also imposed sanctions with regularity. The African Union (AU) has imposed sanctions on ten of its members since 1990; the Arab League has suspended Egypt, Libya, and Syria's membership for at least a period of time; the Organization of American States (OAS) imposed sanctions on Haiti before the UN did; and the Economic Council of West African States (ECOWAS) has sanctioned more than half of its members at one time or another, most often for unconstitutional changes of government. Some countries, particularly the United States, impose unilateral sanctions independently of, and/or in addition to, sanctions imposed by the UN or regional organisations. Overall, sanctions imposition by different parties is not well coordinated and, as discussed below, the different sanctions measures vary in their scope and complexity.

The nature, use and effectiveness of sanctions

TARGETED SANCTIONS

One important characteristic of sanctions use over the past 23 years is that virtually all sanctions (with the exception of some continuing US unilateral measures) are targeted sanctions. Ever since the unacceptably high humanitarian costs of the comprehensive sanctions imposed on Iraq in the 1990s, the world has turned increasingly to the use of targeted sanctions. While comprehensive sanctions remained in place against Iraq until after the US-led invasion in 2003, the last time the UN imposed a new comprehensive sanction on a country was against Haiti in 1994 (following the UN's initial use of targeted measures).

Sanctions can be targeted in a number of different ways. They can target individuals or corporate entities (firms, political parties, rebel groups or a ruling regime or junta), a single sector of activity (arms, diplomacy, diamonds, oil or finance), or they can be restricted in scope of application to a region of a country, or to the territory of a country under the control of a proscribed rebel group. Often, sanctions include a combination of these different types of targeting (individual, sectoral and/or regional targeting). On average, the UN imposes at least three types of targeted sanction simultaneously.

² Andrea Charron and Clara Portela, chapter 5 in *Targeting Sanctions* (note 1).

The move to targeted sanctions is significant, because targeted sanctions operate according to a logic that is different from that of comprehensive sanctions. Not only do they differ in scope, degree and complexity of implementation, but targeted sanctions also differ in their degree of adaptability as a policy instrument. Comprehensive sanctions are an ‘all or nothing’ policy instrument, which terminates all international economic and commercial transactions with a country. They are dramatic policy measures when imposed, but difficult to relax gradually, because any easing of sanctions tends to be seen as a sign of weakness or loss of political will, which in turn can change the calculations of the target. In this sense, comprehensive sanctions are not a very flexible or agile policy instrument.

By contrast, targeted sanctions can be manipulated in response to target behaviour. Like comprehensive sanctions, they are a policy instrument employed within a larger bargaining framework between the sender and the target. Unlike comprehensive measures, however, they can be applied incrementally and be ratcheted upward or downward in response to actions taken by targets. As such, they can be used as a tool to support mediation efforts, providing both potential incentives for cooperation, and sanctions for uncooperative behaviour. Moreover, while comprehensive sanctions are certain to have widespread harmful humanitarian impacts, targeted sanctions vary in their degree of humanitarian impact, which can be quite limited (depending on their design and degree of discrimination). This is the principal reason for the move to targeted sanctions. As a result, today all UN, all EU, and even most US sanctions are targeted sanctions.

SANCTIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS

Although much of the policy, public and scholarly discourse places sanctions as a policy instrument on a continuum between words and war,³ policy-makers rarely, if ever, choose between the use of sanctions and an alternative, such as diplomatic negotiations or the use of force. Indeed, sanctions are always used in conjunction with other measures, including negotiations, referrals to legal tribunals, threats of force, covert measures or the use of force.

Sanctions can complicate mediation and negotiation efforts. Sanctions are often perceived as punitive measures that can provide disincentives for targeted parties to make compromises and reach agreement. International sanctions coming from multiple sources (the UN, EU, AU

or individual countries) are typically imposed by bodies that have no formal institutional association with the peace mediators trying to negotiate an end to a conflict. As a result, individual states or regional organisations may impose new sanctions with little or no direct coordination with peace mediators. Even actions taken within the same organisation, such as the UN Security Council, are often not adequately coordinated with UN mediation efforts, since they are often the product of negotiations among Security Council members trying to agree on broader signals about international norms. Sanctions can complicate negotiations by creating (or not removing) obstacles to participation in negotiations, as they did in the case of the Taliban, some of whose members remained listed by the UN during the early stages of negotiation on the transition in Afghanistan.

Rather than repeating these familiar arguments, however, the purpose of this paper is to explore situations and conditions under which sanctions can support or facilitate on-going peace mediation or peace enforcement efforts at various stages of a negotiation process: achieving a ceasefire, negotiating a comprehensive agreement, maintaining an agreement, and facilitating longer-term peacebuilding.⁴ Since virtually all sanctions are targeted today, can sanctions be employed in the process of mediation and negotiation as flexible instruments of coercive bargaining to achieve or support a negotiation goal? Targeted sanctions can be threatened or strengthened to increase negotiation leverage. Alternatively, the presence of sanctions can be used as an incentive for cooperation, as targets can be offered the possibility of a suspension or selective lifting of the measures, and/or to deter potential spoilers once a peace agreement is signed. The suspension of sanctions in Libya, for example, is credited with breaking the stalemate in the late 1990s in the international dispute over the Lockerbie/UTA bombings. The promise of suspension is also widely credited with playing an important role in the negotiations with Iran about its nuclear programme in 2013 and 2014.

Sanctions can complicate
negotiations by creating
obstacles to participation.

³ Peter Wallensteen and Carina Staibano, *International Sanctions: Between Words and Wars in the Global System* (London: Frank Cass / Routledge, 2005).

⁴ The boundaries between these different categories are, of course, not always distinct.

There are at least three different ways in which sanctions might prove useful in mediation efforts:

1. Sanctions can be employed directly, as incentives for cooperation or to send a signal to deter potential spoilers of a negotiated settlement;
2. Sanctions can be used indirectly, to weaken one of the parties in a conflict. Reducing a group's access to resources such as oil, diamonds, or timber can be used to constrain the ability of a target to continue to engage in proscribed activities;
3. Sanctions can be used to drive a wedge within a regime: supporting a faction more open to bargaining and negotiating a way out of a conflict, and marginalising those who refuse to participate in negotiations.

RECENT SCHOLARLY RESEARCH

What does recent scholarly research on sanctions have to tell us about the relationship between international sanctions and peace negotiations? In what ways can sanctions facilitate negotiation and mediation efforts? Drawing on the recent work of the Targeted Sanctions Consortium (TSC),⁵ this paper begins to answer these questions.


The TSC has introduced two important innovations to the analysis of sanctions that are drawn upon in this paper. First, the unit of analysis is a *case episode* (defined by the combination of targeted sanctions in place and/or the principal purpose or target of the sanctions), rather than a country sanctions regime (e.g. the 'Somalia sanctions,' the 'Iran sanctions'). This is because some sanctions regimes have been in place for more than twenty years and have changed significantly over time in terms of the types of sanctions imposed and the targets designated. The TSC quantitative database includes a total of 63 case episodes for comparative analysis drawn from 23 UN targeted sanctions country regimes, with 290 variables for each case episode. The scope of the project, including the identification of each case episode, is displayed in Figure 1. Annex I contains a summary of the main characteristics of each of the case episodes.

Second, the TSC analysis differentiates between different purposes of sanctions. Most public discourse, and much of the scholarly literature, assesses the effectiveness of sanctions in terms of their ability to coerce a change in target behaviour. While this is a central purpose of sanctions, there are times when it is extremely unlikely that the target of sanctions will give up on a proscribed activity, so much so that the UN Security Council makes no specific demands for a change of behaviour. As a result, some sanctions are designed to constrain, rather than coerce a target. Raising costs and/or forcing a change in strategy are both indications of attempts to constrain a target. Finally, all sanctions send signals about international norms, often to multiple audiences (and with varying degrees of clarity). As a result of the multiple purposes of sanctions – which are often simultaneously pursued by the senders of sanctions – the TSC's assessment of sanctions effectiveness is evaluated in terms of the multiple and differing purposes of targeted sanctions, to:

- **Coerce** a change in behaviour;
- **Constrain** proscribed activities (or access to essential resources such as funds, arms, sensitive goods, thereby raising costs and forcing changes in strategy);
- **Signal** and/or stigmatise targets about violations of international norms.

⁵ *The Targeted Sanctions Consortium (TSC), directed by Thomas Biersteker at the Graduate Institute, Geneva and Sue Eckert at the Watson Institute, Brown University, is a group of more than 50 scholars and policy practitioners worldwide that has worked collaboratively over the past 5 years on an analysis of UN targeted sanctions. Although the UN has more than 23 years of experience with targeted sanctions, there had been no systematic, comprehensive study of their impacts and effectiveness before the TSC initiative.*

Figure 1: United Nations targeted sanctions case episodes



Primary Objectives

- Cease hostilities / Peace enforcement
- Counter-terrorism
- Democracy
- Non-proliferation
- R2P
- Comprehensive sanctions episodes

GENERAL FINDINGS

Most UN sanctions are intended simultaneously to coerce, constrain and signal, but from a close reading of the texts of UN Security Council resolutions, the primary purpose of most resolutions (nearly 60%) is to coerce a change in a target’s behaviour. Given the mandate of the UN Charter, most UN sanctions are applied to situations of armed conflict. Nearly 60% of the case episodes of UN targeted sanctions are concerned primarily with armed conflict, while countering terrorism accounts for an additional 14% (Figure 2). The remainder is made up of attempts to counter non-constitutional changes of government (support democracy) or to enforce non-proliferation goals. Despite the fact that support for human rights is nearly always invoked by the UN Security Council, it is rarely the primary motivation for the imposition of sanctions.

Figure 2: Sanctions objectives by episode




Table 1: Displays the frequency with which the UN imposes different types of targeted sanctions

TYPES OF TARGETED SANCTIONS	%
Sectoral restrictions	92%
Arms imports embargoes	87%
Individual sanctions	73%
Aviation bans	18%
Diplomatic restrictions	13%
Oil import bans	11%

Many of the UN's conflict interventions in Africa involved a combination of arms embargoes, individual targeting and, as appropriate, commodity sanctions on sources of revenue for targeted forces. Counter-terrorism sanctions involve a similar mix, while non-proliferation sanctions tend to rely more heavily on individual designations as well as highly specialised restrictions on proliferation-related goods. There is a great variety in the degree of discrimination of different types of targeted sanctions. It is useful to think about them on a continuum, from the most 'targeted' measures to more 'comprehensive' ones. Figure 3 displays the variation from the most to least discriminating type of targeted sanction. For instance, although both are sanctions on a sector of the economy, an oil embargo affects the population of a country considerably more than, for example, an arms embargo or diplomatic restrictions. This makes oil embargos relatively more 'comprehensive' in the continuum. In contrast to some regional and unilateral sanctions, particularly those currently imposed on Iran, UN sanctions have remained relatively targeted (with the exception of one episode of the sanctions against Libya in 2011).

Despite the fact that support for human rights is nearly always invoked by the UNSC, it is rarely the primary motivation for the imposition of sanctions.

Figure 3: Degrees of sanctions discrimination (or relative ‘comprehensiveness’)

Although the collateral damage to innocent civilian populations from targeted sanctions is significantly less than the damage from comprehensive sanctions, there are nonetheless unintended consequences associated with their application. Indeed, these are observed in 91% of the case episodes. Among the unintended consequences considered in the TSC study, an increase in corruption and criminality was most frequently observed (69%) – not surprising, given that sanctions are prohibition norms that create powerful incentives for evasion. The strengthening of authoritarian rule in the target (54%) and the diversion of government resources from one economic sector to another (44%) were also often identified. Authoritarian governments are in a good position to allocate the costs of the measures to reward their supporters and penalise their opponents. Negative humanitarian consequences, historically the principal concern regarding comprehensive sanctions, were observed in 39% of the episodes studied, depending on the location of the targeted sanctions on the continuum in Figure 3. Also significant, the legitimacy and authority of the Security Council was harmed in more than one third of the cases (39%).⁶

UN sanctions are not an alternative to conflict mediation but rather exist as an additional policy instrument that can, at least in theory, be used in its support. As indicated in Table 2, UN sanctions are nearly always combined with significant diplomatic initiatives (97% of the time). They co-exist with the presence of peacekeeping operations in 59% of the cases, and often with the use of military force (55%), and referrals to legal tribunals (47%). UN sanctions are also rarely the only sanctions being applied to the

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target; sanctions by regional organisations are present in 77% of the cases of UN targeted sanctions, while unilateral sanctions are in place 63% of the time. The co-existence of multiple sanctions regimes from different institutions can be a complicating factor, as discussed more fully below.

Table 2: Additional policy instruments used in combination with sanctions

OTHER POLICY INSTRUMENTS	%
Diplomacy	97%
Peacekeeping operations	59%
Use of force	55%
Legal tribunals	47%
Regional sanctions	77%
Unilateral sanctions	63%

⁶ These assessments are derived from Panel of Expert reports for various UN Sanctions Committees.

Sanctions are effective in coercing a change in behaviour only 10% of the time.

Most large-scale comparative studies of the effectiveness of sanctions (which group targeted sanctions together with comprehensive sanctions and unilateral measures) conclude that sanctions are effective or 'work' about one-third of the time.⁷ Our analysis of 63 episodes of UN targeted sanctions over the past 24 years indicates that, on average, sanctions are effective in coercing, constraining and/or signalling a target about 22% of the time.⁸ More information on how we determine effectiveness is presented in Annexes I and II.

However, the pattern is more interesting and informative, when the analysis is broken down into the different purposes of sanctions (i.e. to coerce a change in behaviour, constrain the activities of a target, or send a powerful signal), as they 'work' in multiple ways. Here, we find that targeted sanctions are much more effective in constraining or signalling a target than they are in coercing

a change in target behaviour. Those who assert that sanctions are ineffective⁹ tend to disregard the multiple purposes of sanctions.

Overall, sanctions are effective in coercing a change in behaviour only 10% of the time. By contrast, they are effective in constraining target behaviour (increasing costs and inducing changes in strategy) more than two-and-a-half-times as frequently, or 27% of the time. They are just as effective in sending signals to target audiences, which they also do 27% of the time. Table 3 displays the frequency distribution and associated percentages of each category of purpose of targeted sanctions.

Table 3: Sanctions effectiveness distribution

	EFFECTIVE	MIXED	INEFFECTIVE
Coerce	10%	10%	80%
Constrain	27%	17%	56%
Signal	27%	30%	43%

The identification of specific country case episodes that we have evaluated as effective, mixed, or ineffective is contained in Annex I.

UN targeted sanctions and peace mediation efforts

As mentioned above, the UN never imposes sanctions in isolation, and targeted sanctions are imposed in conjunction with formal negotiations 97% of the time. The only cases in which negotiations were not underway are the third and fourth episodes of sanctions against Al-Qaida, from September 2001 and June 2011 respectively. The Al-Qaida sanctions are intended primarily to constrain the group, and UN resolutions since the attacks of 11 September 2001 contain no specific demands on the organisation's leadership to change its behaviour (although individuals designated by

the Sanctions Committee can petition for their delisting if they can demonstrate a change in their behaviour or if they can prove that they were mistakenly listed). There is evidence contained in the UN's Al Qaida Sanctions Committee Monitoring Team reports that the UN targeted sanctions have been effective in both constraining and signalling Al-Qaida at the end of the third episode (in June 2011) and continuing evidence of effective constraint, when the current episode was most recently evaluated in 2014. The ability of the group to move funds across borders through formal-sector financial

⁷ Gary Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott, Kimberly Elliott and Barbara Oegg, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*, 3rd edition (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2007). See also, Clifton Morgan, Navin Bapat and Valentina Krustev, 'The threat and imposition of economic sanctions, 1971–2000', *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 28(1): 92–110 (2008).

⁸ This is calculated on the following basis: a total of 38 case episodes have been evaluated as effective (5 in coercing, 16 in constraining, and 17 in signalling) out of a total of 175 possible episodes in which the UN Security Council attempted to coerce, constrain or signal a target. This implies valuing the three distinct purposes of sanctions equally, however, which inflates the positive average amount (since coercing a change in behaviour is inherently more difficult than signalling).

⁹ Fred Kaplan, 'The Sanctions Illusion' posted in Slate, available at: http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/2014/04/obama_sanctions_putin_s_cronies_will_economic_sanctions_stop_russia_from.html (accessed on 10 May 2014).

institutions was virtually halted after 2001. The targeting of particular Islamic charities effectively signalled the need for potential contributors to exercise due diligence in donating to Islamic charities.

Significant diplomatic pressure and/or multilateral negotiations were underway in 87.5% of the effective case episodes, but 100% of the ineffective ones. Given the fact that negotiations are nearly always present, however, these aggregate statistics do not tell us very much about how UN targeted sanctions interact with negotiations. If we examine the breakdown of effectiveness across the different objectives of sanctions – whether they are intended to end armed conflict, to counter proliferation, or to support democracy or non-proliferation goals – some interesting patterns emerge.

UN sanctions have not been effective in coercing, constraining or signalling in *any* of the seven episodes in which non-proliferation was the principal objective of the UN Security Council (in Iran and DPRK). By contrast, there is evidence that they have been effective in two-thirds of the episodes when sanctions have been applied to constrain terrorism (Al-Qaida/Taliban and Libya in the 1990s). They have been most effective in signalling when they are used to indicate concerns about non-constitutional changes of government and in support of peacebuilding efforts.¹⁰ Given the large number of instances in which the Council imposes sanctions to settle armed conflict – in terms of achieving a ceasefire, negotiating a peace agreement, enforcing the peace agreement or supporting peacebuilding – it is not surprising that the distribution of effectiveness reflects the general distribution in the sample as a whole. Table 4 summarises the results.

Table 4: Effectiveness by objective

MAIN OBJECTIVE	COERCE	CONSTRAIN	SIGNAL
Non-proliferation	0%	0%	0%
Counter-terrorism	14.3%	66.7%	11.1%
Armed conflict	14.8%	20.0%	23.3%
Democracy support	0%	33.3%	66.7%
Peacebuilding	0%	33.3%	44.4%
R2P	0%	50%	50%
Support judicial process	0%	N/A	0%
TOTAL	10%	27.1%	25.4%

Much less attention is given to the use of sanctions during the negotiation phase.

Since nearly 60% of UN targeted sanctions are devoted to armed conflict, and since 100% of those involve negotiation efforts, it is useful to explore those cases in greater detail for evidence of what role sanctions may play in support of peace negotiations.

With the exceptions of the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq, all of the armed-conflict sanctions cases are found in Africa. Much of the UN sanctions effort is intended to prepare the ground for peace agreements by securing a ceasefire in the armed conflict. The UN commonly employs arms imports embargoes and attempts to restrict sources of conflict financing for rebel groups at this stage. Once a comprehensive peace agreement has been negotiated and a transitional government put in place, the UN uses individual targeted sanctions such as asset freezes and travel bans, along with arms imports embargoes and commodity sanctions, to enforce and further build the peace. The UN also often employs peacekeeping operations and sometimes tries to secure government engagement in DDR and SSR processes following the negotiation of a peace agreement. Comparatively much less attention is given to the use of sanctions during the actual negotiation phase (see Annex II for a breakdown). This is not to imply that UN sanctions could not be used to support peace negotiations, but rather that it has not been their primary use over the past two decades.

Although the boundaries between different categories are frequently blurred, it is possible to make analytical distinctions between four policy objectives commonly present in peace processes. These objectives can be pursued simultaneously and without any specific linear progression - and they are not necessarily present in every case. By distinguishing the different policy objectives, it is possible to understand with greater precision the mechanisms through which sanctions interact with mediation in each of these situations.

¹⁰ While the percentage is high for responsibility to protect, the sample is very small (only two cases, observed in Libya since 2011).

CEASING HOSTILITIES

The cessation of hostilities, or the achievement of a ceasefire, is a fairly common objective of the UN Security Council in imposing targeted sanctions (in 31 episodes in total) and one that is explicitly stated in its responsibilities under the UN Charter. Since the beginning of the 1990s, approximately one-third (32%) of the episodes involving this goal were effective.

UN targeted sanctions typically contribute to the cessation of hostilities in on-going armed conflicts through signalling to the parties that the UN Security Council is engaged with the matter, an act that may strengthen the diplomatic pressure to bring the various parties to the table. Sanctions may specifically criticise armed groups (or their leadership) for their behaviour in a way that makes it more difficult for them to gather the support necessary to continue their activities, as was the case in Angola between 1998 and 2002. The explicit naming of Jonas Savimbi in the text of UN Security Council resolutions for his role in preventing a ceasefire sent a powerful, stigmatising signal. In Somalia and Liberia, strong signals were sent when secondary sanctions were applied on Eritrea for its arms sales to Al Shabaab and on Liberia for its support of the RUF in Sierra Leone. In Sierra Leone, the UN's endorsement of the AU's position on the unconstitutional change of government sent a powerful signal to the military coup leaders, while in the DRC, the transition government in place between 2005 and 2008 was signalled as legitimate to potential spoilers. In seven of the ten effective case episodes where obtaining a ceasefire was a policy objective of the UN Security Council, the process of influence was more indirect. In these cases, the targeted parties were not able to continue the armed conflict at previous levels of intensity. This was evident for example in Liberia, where Charles Taylor complained explicitly that the arms and commodities embargoes had denied the Liberians the right to defend themselves, and in Angola, where the arms embargo and diamond sanctions starved the UNITA rebels of critical resources to continue and prevail in the conflict. Similarly, following the secondary sanctions imposed on Eritrea, the reduction in arms flows into Somalia did not result in a formal ceasefire, but it did alter the balance of forces on the ground.

In three of the case episodes – Sierra Leone in 1997 and 2000 and in Liberia in 2003 – there was direct evidence of a ceasefire being achieved at least in part because of the sanctions on arms, individuals and commodities. In the case of Sierra Leone, the diamond sanctions applied against the RUF in 2000 are credited with contributing to

its decision to sign an unconditional ceasefire in November 2000 and reaffirm the agreement in May 2001. In Liberia, the sanctions on timber contributed to the ceasefire agreement signed by Charles Taylor and the LURD in June 2003, though other factors (changes on the ground, and indictment by the Special Court) were probably more significant.

NEGOTIATING A PEACE AGREEMENT

While the negotiation of peace agreements is very often an important goal when UN sanctions are imposed, it is not as common as ceasing hostilities, enforcing peace agreements or peacebuilding. Of 14 armed conflict country sanctions cases, only half of them have negotiation of a peace agreement stated in the relevant UN Security Council resolutions as an explicit goal. Among these seven cases, only one episode (the second episode of UN sanctions on Libya in 2011) was effective. However, the episode is considered effective because the sanctions constrained the former Qadhafi government from paying mercenary forces, not because it directly contributed to a negotiated settlement of the conflict.

This does not mean that UN targeted sanctions have not indirectly supported the negotiation and signing of peace agreements. Indeed, it is common that the achievement of a ceasefire (discussed above) is an important first step toward bringing the parties to the table for negotiating more lasting settlements. In addition, the 'strategic' weakening of a party in the conflict (due to sanctions targeted on its key revenue source) may significantly contribute to its decision to seek the resolution of the conflict through negotiated means.

ENFORCING PEACE AGREEMENTS

Peace enforcement refers specifically to the period after a peace agreement has been concluded, but is not yet fully implemented and/or still faces some challenges and threats from spoilers. Enforcing peace agreements is a very common objective for UN targeted sanctions, present in all but 3 of the 14 armed conflict country sanction regimes. Of these, nearly half (or 47%) were considered effective, a relatively high proportion when compared with the other conflict-related goals in Annex II.

As in the case of achieving a cessation of hostilities, UN targeted sanctions contribute to peace enforcement in armed conflicts through signalling to the targeted parties that the UN Security Council is directly engaged in the matter, an act that may increase incentives to adhere to an agreement (or, at least, not challenge it directly). Effective peace enforcement tends to appear in the latter stages of armed conflict cases, in what are often rather long and drawn-out case episodes, such as Liberia's current episode (8+ years), Sierra Leone's (8+ years), and Rwanda's (12+ years) final episodes before sanctions were lifted. Of the 14 effective episodes where peace enforcement was an explicit objective, 11 entail effective signalling. These include the DRC, where Panel of Experts reports indicate that major warring parties concluded that elections were preferable to violence for a time in 2005–2008. In Côte d'Ivoire in 2010–2011, financial sanctions were applied to Laurent Gbagbo and his key supporters for their refusal to accept the UN-certified election results. Rescinding access to Central Bank accounts was a decisive factor in constraining the regime before it was overthrown with French military assistance.

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Another mechanism through which sanctions can support the enforcement of peace agreements is through the containment of potential spoilers of the peace process. This is particularly effective when sanctions are able to starve spoilers of the resources they need to engage in proscribed activities, often through individual financial asset freezes or commodity sanctions. This was the case, for example, in the fourth episode of Sierra Leone sanctions in 2000, when the UN Security Council added secondary sanctions on Liberia (in addition to the existing sanctions on diamond exports) for its support of the armed conflict in Sierra Leone. Sanctions applied in Liberia were

considered to have almost completely halted the traffic of illicit rough diamonds between Sierra Leone and Liberia, and 'probably contributed to the RUF's decision to sign an unconditional ceasefire in November 2000 and reaffirm the agreement in May 2001.'¹¹ UN targeted sanctions did not achieve these objectives alone, of course, since both the presence of British forces in Sierra Leone and on-going peace mediation efforts played important roles.

UN sanctions contributed to the goal of peace enforcement in four instances where they appear to have coerced a change in target behaviour. In two instances, targeted sanctions contributed to ensuring that electoral processes agreed to in previously negotiated agreements were carried out – in the DRC in 2008 and in Côte d'Ivoire in 2010. In two other instances, they contributed to the decision to allow the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces in rebel-held territory in Sierra Leone and to persuade Eritrea to stop exporting arms to Al-Shabaab in Somalia, a move undertaken by the UN Security Council to support the Transitional Federal Government in the country.

SUPPORTING PEACEBUILDING GOALS

UN targeted sanctions have been increasingly used in support of broader peacebuilding goals, after a peace agreement has been reached and a relatively stable transitional government has been put in place. Additional objectives are considered important to increase the probability that the situation will not slide back to one of widespread violence and conflict. These objectives include: concluding an effective Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration (DDR) process; completing Security Sector Reform (SSR); ensuring that an effective tracking and certification scheme for natural resources has been institutionalised; and/or making sure that regular elections are held. Supporting peacebuilding is an objective of UN targeted sanctions in ten different episodes, of which 4 (or 40%) were considered to be effective, as shown in Table 4.

There are two fundamental mechanisms through which UN targeted sanctions support peacebuilding. First, sanctions may continue the containment of potential spoilers of the peace process as the post-war government becomes stable and capable of asserting its authority over the territory. In this context, it is not uncommon that key potential spoilers remain targets of financial sanctions as a way to constrain their capacities, as well as to de-legitimise their activities in the region. This has clearly been the case in Liberia, where former associates of Charles Taylor remain on the list of

¹¹ UN Expert Meeting on Natural Resources and Conflict in Africa, Cairo, 2006.

targets at the insistence of the Liberian government. In Libya, members of the Qadhafi family and top supporters of the former regime continue to be on the list of designated parties, despite the recent changes in the nature of the conflict in the country.

Second, UN targeted sanctions are sometimes used to pressure the transitional government itself to continue to implement important peacebuilding objectives, like ensuring the demobilisation of all armed groups (and not just those it opposes), asserting its control over natural resources, and holding free and fair elections. This has been the case, for example, in Côte d'Ivoire following the election of Alassane Ouattara in 2011. Here, sanctions were left in place to ensure not only that Laurent Gbagbo's supporters would not be able to destabilise the new government, but

also to place pressure on the Ouattara government to hold parliamentary elections, abide by international human rights norms in dealing with the opposition, meet the standards of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, and complete SSR and DDR in a transition to a consolidated democracy. The current episode of the UN sanctions regime in Liberia has also insisted on effective institutionalisation of a certification scheme – in this instance not only for diamonds, but also for timber. During the long fifth, and final, episode of UN sanctions against Sierra Leone between 2002 and 2010, the transitional government was pressed first to ensure that local elections were held, an opposition party was consolidated, and, later, that the Special Court established for the prosecution of war crimes would be functional.

Conclusion: coordination challenges

There are several reasons to expect that sanctions might complicate mediation efforts, and we could provide a great many empirical illustrations of difficulties arising between them from our research on UN targeted sanctions. For example: the DPRK's withdrawal from the Six Party Talks in 2009 following the imposition of new sanctions, and the complaints of the principal mediator between the M23 rebels and the DRC about not being informed in advance of new sanctions on the rebel group in 2013. Yet, mediation processes and sanctions are not inherently contradictory, and this paper presents a number of arguments and empirical examples illustrating different ways in which they can complement one another. Although examples of complementarity generally remain the exception, rather than the norm, it is important to recall that sanctions tend to be employed in some of the most difficult and intractable conflict situations. Therefore, we conclude this paper with some reflections on how to strengthen complementarity between sanctions and mediation.

Many of the complications between sanctions and mediation derive from problems of coordination. These present difficult challenges but, as discussed, they are problems that can be addressed. At a structural level, there are four reasons why sanctions can complicate peace mediation efforts:

1. **International sanctions are often imposed by institutional bodies different from those overseeing the mediation.** For instance, negotiations may be conducted under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General, but sanctions may be imposed by individual Member States, or by regional organisations with little or no coordination with UN mediation efforts already underway;
2. **Coordination can be problematic even if conducted within the same organisation.** For example, actions taken by the UN Security Council may not be effectively coordinated with

mediation efforts conducted under the auspices of the Secretary-General. Security Council sanctions are often embedded in a larger political process of sending signals about international norms that may or may not be the top priority of a peace mediator. Indeed, they can complicate negotiations by creating (or not removing) obstacles to participation in negotiations, as they did in the case of the Taliban, some of whose members remained listed by the UN Al-Qaida/Taliban Sanctions Committee during the early stages of negotiation on the transition in Afghanistan;

3. International sanctions from multiple sources (UN, EU, AU) may not be well-coordinated.

The measures imposed by different actors may vary dramatically in the type of sanctions and their degree of discrimination. While UN sanctions remain highly targeted, US and EU sanctions can be very broad in their scope (and begin to approximate comprehensive measures in design and/or implementation), as the international sanctions against Iran have become since 2012. The targets of sanctions often do not differentiate between the different institutional sources of sanctions, further complicating the tasks of UN mediators who represent the institutional body that designs the most targeted of sanctions, but whose measures are often grouped together with the much broader EU and US sanctions in the minds of the targeted parties;

4. The mediator and the UN Security Council may operate on different time scales.

The peace mediator may change course rapidly, as circumstances permit, but the Security Council takes longer to negotiate changes of strategy among its members (though as use and familiarity with the dynamics of targeted sanctions increase, there is a growing appreciation of their flexibility).

There is relatively little that an individual UN peace mediator can do to prevent new sanctions from being imposed by a strongly motivated state or regional organisation. A mediator can, however, try to raise awareness about the sanctions, among both the senders of sanctions and their potential targets. With regard to sending institutions, a proactive role in informing legislatures or representatives of regional organisations of the potential consequences of their actions could be taken. These actors need to be made aware of the practical effects of measures which

may appear desirable to their constituencies, but can actually worsen the situation. With regard to the targets of sanctions, the constructive ambiguity of the threat of additional measures from different sources of sanctions could be used to encourage them to make concessions before things get worse. Specifically, differences in the scope of sanctions imposed by different senders can be used to encourage the target to move toward the position advocated by the more moderate sender(s) of sanctions. Sanctions often play an important role in signalling normative positions, standards and political resolve, and can reinforce the diplomatic efforts or pressure placed on the negotiating parties, as they have in the case of Russia over Ukraine.

In general, coordination within the UN system remains a persistent challenge.¹² Most of the sanctions research on UN coordination challenges has focused on problems of coordination between sanctions implementation/enforcement and the role of UN peacekeeping forces, or the challenges faced by UN panels of experts in their relationships with other UN officials in the field. Overall, relatively little attention has been paid to the relationship between sanctions and peace mediation efforts, though some relatively recent institutional innovations at the UN level offer some interesting ideas about how to bridge the gap between UN mediators and the UN Security Council.

The increased importance given to Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSGs) is a promising development, particularly when the individuals holding these positions are entrepreneurial about their role and what they can achieve. This has notably been the case in Guinea-Bissau, where the Security Council imposed travel bans on individuals preventing the restoration of the constitutional order in the country following the military coup in May 2012. The SRSG, in cooperation with the Peacebuilding Commission, took the lead in negotiating not only with the targeted individuals, but also with influential regional actors imposing sanctions (notably ECOWAS). In this instance, the SRSG has been able to proactively guide and support the work of the UN Security Council on the matter, rather than simply reacting to it.

The complications arising from international sanctions emanating from multiple sources - the UN; regional organisations like the EU, AU, OAS or ECOWAS; and individual states - are considerable and pose a challenge for analysts. The UN faces a particular problem in this

¹² See especially *Alix Boucher and Caty Clement, chapter 6 in Targeting Sanctions (note 1)*.

Sanctions should be imposed
with as much consideration,
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regard. While UN sanctions remain relatively targeted (when compared with those of some individual countries and regional organisations), their language often justifies or encourages individual Member States or regional organisations to ‘exercise vigilance’ with regard to the enforcement of the sanctions.

Many countries interpret this as encouragement to do more under the auspices of a legally binding Chapter VII mandate, justifying additional measures and creating a cacophony of different sanctions regimes with different scope and requirements. As a result, the UN has not been able to maintain a leading role in sanctions policy, weakening its ability to use targeted sanctions in a calibrated manner in response to actions taken by targets or developments on the ground. The designers of sanctions resolutions in New York should take this into consideration the next time they invoke ‘exercising vigilance’ in a Security Council resolution, tailoring it to strengthen the enforcement of UN sanctions, rather than encouraging additional measures from other entities.

UN targeted sanctions need to be conceptualised in strategic terms, in relationship to other measures, such as peace mediation efforts. They should be designed with the kind of deliberation and planning that go into military operations, with a clear understanding of purposes, objectives, consequences, impact assessments, unintended consequences, coping and evasive measures, contingency planning and exit strategies. In order to take advantage of the potential complementarity with peace mediation efforts, sanctions should be imposed with as much consideration, deliberation, planning and debate as the use of force. The challenges are demanding, but the potential for greater complementarity between sanctions and mediation is worth the effort.

Annex I: List of cases and episodes, UN sanctions 1991–2014

SANCTION REGIME	EPISODE	START DATE	END DATE	DURATION	MAIN OBJECTIVE	SANCTION TYPE	EFFECTIVENESS		
							COERCE	CONSTRAIN	SIGNAL
Al-Qaida/ Taliban	Episode 1	28.08.1998	19.12.2000	2 years 4 months	Counter- terrorism	Aviation ban, financial asset freeze (individual/entity, political entity)	Ineffective	Ineffective	Mixed
	Episode 2	19.12.2000	11.09.2001	9 months	Counter- terrorism	Aviation ban, financial asset freeze (individual/entity, political entity), arms imports embargo (government forces), diplomatic sanctions (limit diplomatic representation), chemical acetic anhydride imports ban (heroin processing)	Ineffective	Mixed	Mixed
	Episode 3	11.09.2001	17.06.2011	9 years 9 months	Counter- terrorism	Aviation ban (lifted Jan 2002), financial asset freeze (individual/ entity, political entity), arms imports embargo (non-governmental entities), travel ban	N/A	Effective	Effective
	Episode 4	17.06.2011	Ongoing	> 2 years	Counter- terrorism	Financial asset freeze (individual/ entity), arms imports embargo (non-governmental entities), travel ban	N/A	Effective	Ineffective
Angola	Episode 1	15.09.1993	28.08.1997	3 years 11 months	Armed conflict	Arms imports embargo (non-governmental entities), petroleum imports embargo	Ineffective	Mixed	Mixed
	Episode 2	28.08.1997	12.06.1998	10 months	Armed conflict	Arms imports embargo (non-governmental entities), petroleum imports embargo, aviation ban, diplomatic sanctions (limit diplomatic representation, visa cancellation), travel ban	Ineffective	Mixed	Mixed
	Episode 3	12.06.1998	12.01.1999	7 months	Armed conflict	Arms imports embargo (non-governmental entities), petroleum imports embargo, aviation ban, diplomatic sanctions (limit diplomatic representation, visa cancellation), travel ban, financial asset freeze (individual/entity, political entity), diamond exports embargo, mining services equipment imports ban, transportation services and equipment imports ban	Ineffective	Effective	Effective
Central African Republic	Episode 4	12.01.1999	09.12.2002	3 years 11 months	Armed conflict	Arms imports embargo (non-governmental entities), petroleum imports embargo, aviation ban, diplomatic sanctions (limit diplomatic representation; visa cancellation – suspended May 2002, lifted Nov 2002), travel ban (suspended May 2002, lifted Nov 2002), financial asset freeze (individual/entity, political entity), diamond exports embargo, mining services equipment imports ban, transportation services and equipment imports ban	Ineffective	Effective	Effective
	Episode 1	05.12.2013	Ongoing	< 1 year	Armed conflict	Arms imports embargo (non-governmental entities), travel ban, financial assets freeze (individual/ entity)	Ineffective	Ineffective	Ineffective

SANCTION REGIME	EPISODE	START DATE	END DATE	DURATION	MAIN OBJECTIVE	SANCTION TYPE	EFFECTIVENESS		
							COERCION	CONSTRAIN	SIGNAL
Côte d'Ivoire	Episode 1	15.11.2004	01.02.2005	3 months	Armed conflict	Arms imports embargo (all parties), travel ban, financial asset freeze (individual/entity)	Ineffective	Ineffective	Ineffective
	Episode 2	01.02.2005	15.12.2005	10 months	Armed conflict	Arms imports embargo (all parties), travel ban, financial asset freeze (individual/entity)	Ineffective	Ineffective	Ineffective
	Episode 3	15.12.2005	20.12.2010	5 years	Armed conflict	Arms imports embargo (all parties), travel ban, financial asset freeze (individual/entity), diamond exports ban	Effective	Ineffective	Mixed
	Episode 4	20.12.2010	28.04.2011	4 months	Democracy support	Arms imports embargo (all parties), travel ban, financial asset freeze (individual/entity), diamond exports ban	Ineffective	Ineffective	Effective
	Episode 5	28.04.2011	Ongoing	> 3 years	Armed conflict	Arms imports embargo (non-governmental entities – from Apr 2012), travel ban, financial asset freeze (individual/ entity), diamond exports ban	Ineffective	Mixed	Ineffective
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	Episode 1	14.10.2006	13.04.2009	2 years 6 months	Non-proliferation	Arms imports (government forces) and exports embargo, WMD-related dual use technology imports and exports ban, luxury goods ban, financial asset freeze (individual/ entity), travel ban	Mixed	Ineffective	Mixed
	Episode 2	13.04.2009	03.07.2013	4 years 3 months	Non-proliferation	Arms imports (government forces) and exports embargo, WMD-related dual use technology imports and exports ban, luxury goods ban, financial asset freeze (individual/entity), travel ban, bunkering ban	Ineffective	Mixed	Mixed
	Episode 3	03.07.2013	Ongoing	< 1 year	Non-proliferation	Arms imports (government forces) and exports embargo, WMD-related dual use technology imports ban, luxury goods ban, financial asset freeze (individual/entity), travel ban, bunkering ban, various financial restrictions (financial services, transfers, and support, including bulk cash and insurance)	Ineffective	Mixed	Mixed
Democratic Republic of the Congo	Episode 1	28.07.2003	18.04.2005	1 year 9 months	Armed conflict	Arms imports embargo (all parties)	Ineffective	Ineffective	Mixed
	Episode 2	18.04.2005	31.03.2008	2 years 11 months	Armed conflict	Arms imports embargo (non-governmental entities), travel ban, financial asset freeze (individual/entity)	Effective	Mixed	Effective
	Episode 3	31.03.2008	28.05.2010	2 years 2 months	Armed conflict	Arms imports embargo (non-governmental entities), travel ban, financial asset freeze (individual/entity)	Ineffective	Effective	Ineffective
	Episode 4	28.05.2010	Ongoing	> 3 years	Armed conflict	Arms imports embargo (non-governmental entities), travel ban, financial asset freeze (individual/entity)	Ineffective	Ineffective	Ineffective
Eritrea/ Ethiopia	Episode 1	17.05.2000	16.05.2001	1 year	Armed conflict	Arms imports embargo (all parties)	Ineffective	Ineffective	Ineffective

SANCTION REGIME	EPISODE	START DATE	END DATE	DURATION	MAIN OBJECTIVE	SANCTION TYPE	EFFECTIVENESS		
							COERCE	CONSTRAIN	SIGNAL
Former Republic of Yugoslavia	Episode 1	25.09.1991	30.05.1992	8 months	Armed conflict	Arms imports embargo (all parties)	N/A	Ineffective	Mixed
	Episode 2	30.05.1992	18.03.1996	3 years 10 months	Armed conflict	Comprehensive sanctions	(Effective)	(Effective)	(Effective)
Guinea-Bissau	Episode 1	18.05.2012	Ongoing	> 1 year	Democracy support	Travel ban	Ineffective	Ineffective	Mixed
Haiti	Episode 1	16.06.1993	27.08.1993	2 months	Democracy support	Oil exports embargo, arms imports embargo (government forces), financial asset freeze (government and regime)	Mixed	Effective	Effective
	Episode 2	27.08.1993	13.10.1993	2 months	Democracy support	Suspension of sanctions	N/A	Ineffective	Ineffective
	Episode 3	13.10.1993	06.05.1994	7 months	Democracy support	Oil exports embargo, arms imports embargo (government forces), financial asset freeze and transfer	Ineffective	Effective	Effective
	Episode 4	06.05.1994	31.07.1994	3 months	Democracy support	Comprehensive sanctions	(Ineffective)	(Ineffective)	(Effective)
	Episode 5	31.07.1994	16.10.1994	3 months	Democracy support	Comprehensive sanctions	(Ineffective)	(Effective)	(Ineffective)
Iran	Episode 1	23.12.2006	24.03.2007	3 months	Non-proliferation	Proliferation sensitive goods and technology ban, financial asset freeze (individual/entity)	Ineffective	Ineffective	Mixed
	Episode 2	24.03.2007	03.03.2008	1 year	Non-proliferation	Proliferation sensitive goods and technology ban, financial asset freeze (individual/entity), arms exports embargo (government forces)	Ineffective	Ineffective	Mixed
	Episode 3	03.03.2008	21.09.2009	1 year 7 months	Non-proliferation	Proliferation sensitive goods and technology ban, financial asset freeze (individual/entity), arms exports embargo, travel ban	Ineffective	Ineffective	Mixed
	Episode 4	21.09.2009	Ongoing	> 4 years	Non-proliferation	Proliferation sensitive goods and technology ban, financial asset freeze (individual/entity), arms exports embargo, travel ban, bunkering ban	Ineffective	Mixed	Mixed
Iraq	Episode 1	22.05.2003	08.06.2004	1 year	Armed conflict	Arms imports embargo (all parties), financial asset freeze and transfer	N/A	Ineffective	Ineffective
	Episode 2	08.06.2004	Ongoing	> 9 years	Armed conflict	Arms imports embargo (non-governmental entities), financial asset freeze and transfer	N/A	Ineffective	Ineffective
Kosovo	Episode 1	31.03.1998	10.09.2001	3 years 5 months	Armed conflict	Arms imports embargo (all parties)	Ineffective	Ineffective	Ineffective
Lebanon	Episode 1	31.10.2005	Ongoing	> 8 years	Judicial process	Travel ban, financial asset freeze (individual/entity) [No designations made to date]	Ineffective	N/A	Ineffective

SANCTION REGIME	EPISODE	START DATE	END DATE	DURATION	MAIN OBJECTIVE	SANCTION TYPE	EFFECTIVENESS		
							COERCION	CONSTRAIN	SIGNAL
Liberia	Episode 1	19.11.1992	07.03.2001	8 years 4 months	Armed conflict	Arms imports embargo (all parties)	Ineffective	Ineffective	Ineffective
	Episode 2	07.03.2001	06.05.2003	2 years 2 months	Armed conflict	Arms imports embargo (government forces), diamond exports ban, travel ban	Mixed	Effective	Effective
	Episode 3	06.05.2003	22.12.2003	8 months	Armed conflict	Arms imports embargo (government forces), diamond exports ban, travel ban, timber exports ban	Ineffective	Effective	Effective
	Episode 4	22.12.2003	16.06.2006	2 years 6 months	Armed conflict	Arms imports embargo (all parties), diamond exports ban, travel ban, timber exports ban, financial asset freeze (individual/ entity)	N/A	Effective	Effective
	Episode 5	16.06.2006	Ongoing	> 7 years	Good governance	Arms imports embargo (non-governmental entities), diamond exports ban, travel ban, financial asset freeze (individual/entity)	N/A	Effective	Effective
Libya I	Episode 1	31.03.1992	11.11.1993	1 year 7 months	Counter-terrorism	Aviation ban, arms imports embargo (government forces), diplomatic sanctions (limit travel and number of diplomatic personnel, limit visas)	Mixed	Effective	Mixed
	Episode 2	11.11.1993	05.04.1999	5 years 5 months	Counter-terrorism	Aviation ban, arms imports embargo (government forces), diplomatic sanctions (limit travel and number of diplomatic personnel, limit visas), financial asset freeze (government), oil services equipment ban	Mixed	Effective	Ineffective
	Episode 3	05.04.1999	12.09.2003	4 years 5 months	Counter-terrorism	Suspension of sanctions	Effective	N/A	Mixed
Libya II	Episode 1	26.02.2011	17.03.2011	1 month	R2P	Arms imports and exports embargo (all parties), financial asset freeze (individual/entity), travel ban	Ineffective	Mixed	Effective
	Episode 2	17.03.2011	16.09.2011	6 months	R2P	No-fly zone, arms imports (all parties) and exports embargo, financial asset freeze (individual/ entity, sovereign wealth funds/Central Bank), travel ban	Ineffective	Effective	Ineffective
	Episode 3	16.09.2011	Ongoing	> 2 years	Armed conflict	Arms imports and exports embargo, financial asset freeze (individual/entity), travel ban	N/A	Ineffective	Effective
Rwanda	Episode 1	17.05.1994	16.08.1995	1 year 3 months	Armed conflict	Arms imports embargo (all parties)	Ineffective	Ineffective	Ineffective
	Episode 2	16.08.1995	10.07.2008	12 years 11 months	Armed conflict	Arms imports embargo (non-governmental entities)	N/A	Ineffective	Ineffective

SANCTION REGIME	EPISODE	START DATE	END DATE	DURATION	MAIN OBJECTIVE	SANCTION TYPE	EFFECTIVENESS		
							COERCE	CONSTRAIN	SIGNAL
Sierra Leone	Episode 1	08.10.1997	16.03.1998	5 months	Democracy support	Travel ban, arms imports embargo (all parties), petroleum imports embargo	Ineffective	Mixed	Effective
	Episode 2	16.03.1998	22.10.1999	7 months	Armed conflict	Travel ban, arms imports embargo (non-governmental entities)	Ineffective	Ineffective	Ineffective
	Episode 3	22.10.1999	05.07.2000	9 months	Armed conflict	Travel ban, arms imports embargo (non-governmental entities)	Ineffective	Ineffective	Ineffective
	Episode 4	05.07.2000	16.01.2002	1 year 6 months	Armed conflict	Travel ban, arms imports embargo (non-governmental entities), diamond exports ban	Effective	Effective	Effective
	Episode 5	16.01.2002	29.09.2010	8 years 8 months	Armed conflict	Travel ban, arms imports embargo (non-governmental entities) [Diamond exports ban lifted June 2003]	N/A	Effective	Effective
Somalia	Episode 1	23.01.1992	03.05.2002	10 years 3 months	Armed conflict	Arms imports embargo (all parties)	Ineffective	Ineffective	Ineffective
	Episode 2	03.05.2002	20.11.2008	6 years 7 months	Armed conflict	Arms imports embargo (non-governmental entities)	Ineffective	Ineffective	Ineffective
	Episode 3	20.11.2008	23.12.2009	1 year 1 month	Armed conflict	Arms imports embargo (non-governmental entities), financial asset freeze (individual/entity, political entity), travel ban	N/A	Ineffective	Ineffective
	Episode 4	23.12.2009	22.02.2012	2 years 2 months	Armed conflict	Arms imports embargo (non-governmental entities), financial asset freeze (individual/entity, political entity), travel ban, diaspora tax ban, secondary sanctions on Eritrea	Effective	Ineffective	Effective
	Episode 5	22.02.2012	Ongoing	> 2 years	Armed conflict	Arms imports embargo (non-governmental entities), financial asset freeze (individual/entity, political entity), travel ban, secondary sanctions on Eritrea, charcoal ban	N/A	Ineffective	Ineffective
Sudan I	Episode 1	26.04.1996	16.08.1996	4 months	Counter-terrorism	Diplomatic sanctions (limit travel and number of diplomatic personnel)	Ineffective	N/A	Mixed
	Episode 2	16.08.1996	28.09.2001	5 years 1 month	Counter-terrorism	Diplomatic sanctions (limit travel and number of diplomatic personnel), aviation ban [never in effect]	Ineffective	N/A	Ineffective
Sudan II	Episode 1	30.07.2004	29.03.2005	8 months	Armed conflict	Arms imports embargo (non-governmental entities)	Ineffective	Ineffective	Ineffective
	Episode 2	29.03.2005	Ongoing	> 9 years	Armed conflict	Arms imports embargo (all parties), financial asset freeze (individual/entity), travel ban	Ineffective	Ineffective	Ineffective

SANCTION REGIME	EPISODE	START DATE	END DATE	DURATION	MAIN OBJECTIVE	SANCTION TYPE	EFFECTIVENESS		
							COERCE	CONSTRAIN	SIGNAL
Taliban	Episode 1	08.01.2010	17.06.2011	1 year 5 months	Armed conflict	Arms imports embargo (non-governmental entities), financial asset freeze (individual/entity, political entity), travel ban	Ineffective	Ineffective	Ineffective
	Episode 2	17.06.2011	Ongoing	> 2 years	Armed conflict	Arms imports embargo (non-governmental entities), financial asset freeze (individual/entity, political entity), travel ban	Ineffective	Ineffective	Mixed

Note: Sanctions effectiveness during each episode is determined based on a combined evaluation of: (a) the overall policy outcome for each of the three purposes (coerce, constrain, signal); and (b) the United Nations sanctions contribution to this outcome. Policy outcome uses a 5-point scale while UN sanctions contribution uses a 6-point scale from least to most impact. In order to be considered effective, the overall policy outcome must be at least 4 (corresponding to 'meeting most UNSC resolutions' objectives' in coercion, 'increases in costs, minor strategy changes, experiencing some financial/material/logistical difficulties, constraint of proscribed activity' in constraint, and 'norms articulated and targets strongly stigmatised' in signalling) and the UN sanctions contribution must be modest (3), major (4) or significant (5). Cases where UN sanctions contribution is negative (0), absent (1) or minor (2) are considered ineffective. Mixed effectiveness results from overall policy outcomes coded as 3 (corresponding to 'accommodation or significant concessions to resolve the dispute' in coercion, 'slight increases in costs to target' in constraint, and 'norms articulation and some stigmatisation' in signalling) and at least modest (3) UN sanctions contribution. The full criteria used for sanctions effectiveness evaluation can be found in the table on page 20.

EVALUATION CRITERIA FOR SANCTION EFFECTIVENESS	
OVERALL POLICY OUTCOME (COERCE)	UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS CONTRIBUTION TO THE OUTCOME (COERCE)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Lack of significant change in behaviour, ignoring the UNSCR, or complete intransigence. (2) Agreeing to a process and/or engaging in negotiations that could result in settling or resolving the dispute or in obfuscation, delaying, or changing terms of debate. (3) Accommodation or significant concessions to resolve the dispute. (4) Meeting most of the objectives of the UNSCR and/or approximating the core purposes as originally articulated in the UNSCR (not necessarily according to the explicit terms spelled out in the original UNSCR). (5) Meeting all the principal objectives of the UNSCR. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (0) Negative (regime is strengthened and/or increases its proscribed activity) (1) None (no discernible sanctions contribution). (2) Minor (other measures taken appear most significant to outcome). (3) Modest (sanctions reinforced other measures). (4) Major (sanctions appear necessary, but not sufficient; some acknowledgement by the target). (5) Significant (the single most important factor is the presence of UNSC sanctions).
OVERALL POLICY OUTCOME (CONSTRAIN)	UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS CONTRIBUTION TO THE OUTCOME (CONSTRAIN)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (1) No discernible constraints experienced by the target. (2) Increases in costs can be managed by the target (sanctions are largely a nuisance factor) perhaps due to ease of evasion. (3) Slight increases in costs to target (as evidenced by diversion of trade through third countries, and/or delay in engaging in proscribed activity and/or diminution in the frequency of engagement in proscribed activity). (4) Increases in costs, minor changes of strategy of the target, statement that target may be experiencing financial/material/logistical difficulties and/or constrained from engaging in proscribed activity. (5) Significant increases in costs, changes of strategy of the target, statement that target is experiencing financial/material/logistical difficulties and/or constrained from engaging in proscribed activity. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (0) Negative (regime is strengthened and/or increases its proscribed activity) (1) None (no discernible sanctions contribution). (2) Minor (other measures taken appear most significant to outcome). (3) Modest (sanctions reinforced other measures). (4) Major (sanctions appear necessary but not sufficient; or some acknowledgement by target). (5) Significant (the single most important factor is the presence of UNSC sanctions).
OVERALL POLICY OUTCOME (SIGNAL)	UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS CONTRIBUTION TO THE OUTCOME (SIGNAL)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Norm (or norms) not articulated, no stigmatisation and/or clear evidence of legitimisation. (2) Norm (or norms) poorly articulated (e.g. too many, diffusely articulated), limited evidence of stigmatisation and/or possible legitimisation. (3) Norm (or norms) articulated, and some stigmatisation of target. (4) Norm (or norms) articulated and targets strongly stigmatised. (5) Norm (or norms) clearly articulated and target fully stigmatised and/or isolated (e.g. effective signalling to the international community and stigmatising and/or isolation of the target). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (0) Negative (regime is strengthened and/or increases its proscribed activity) (1) None (no discernible sanctions contribution). (2) Minor (other measures taken appear most significant to outcome). (3) Modest (sanctions reinforced other measures). (4) Major (sanctions appear necessary, but not sufficient; or some acknowledgement by the target). (5) Significant (the single most important factor is the presence of UNSC sanctions).

Annex II: Armed conflict sanctions effectiveness by sanctions regime episode

ARMED CONFLICT			
Cease hostilities	Negotiate peace agreement	Enforce peace	Support peacebuilding
Former Yugoslavia EP1, 1991–96		Former Yugoslavia EP1 1991–96	
Somalia EP1, 1992–2002	Somalia EP2, 2002–08	Somalia EP3, 2008–09 Somalia EP4,*° 2009–12	Somalia EP5, 2012 –
Somalia EP2, 2002–08			
Somalia EP3, 2008–09			
Somalia EP4,*° 2009–12			
Somalia EP5, 2012–			
Liberia EP1, 1992–2001		Liberia EP1, 1992–2001 Liberia EP2,^° 2001–03 Liberia EP3,^° 2003 Liberia EP4, 2003–06	Liberia EP4,^° 2003–06 Liberia EP5,^° 2006–
Liberia EP2,^° 2001–03			
Liberia EP3,^° 2003			
Liberia EP4, 2003–06			
Angola EP1, 1993–97		Angola EP1, 1993–97 Angola EP2, 1997–98 Angola EP3,^° 1998–99 Angola EP4,^° 1999–2002	
Angola EP2, 1997–98			
Angola EP3,^° 1998–99			
Angola EP4,^° 1999–2002			
Rwanda EP1, 1994–95	Rwanda EP1, 1994–95	Rwanda EP2, 1995–2008	Rwanda EP2, 1995–2008
Rwanda EP2, 1995–2008			
Sierra Leone EP1,° 1997–98			
Sierra Leone EP2, 1998–99			
Sierra Leone EP3, 1999–2000			
Sierra Leone EP4,*^° 2000–02			
Kosovo EP1, 1998–2001	Kosovo EP1, 1998–2001	Kosovo EP1, 1998–2001	
Ethiopia – Eritrea EP1, 2000–01	Ethiopia–Eritrea EP1, 2000–01		
DRC EP1, 2003–05		DRC EP1, 2003–05 DRC EP2,*° 2005–08 DRC EP3,^ 2008–10 DRC EP4, 2010–	
DRC EP2,*° 2005–08			
DRC EP3,^ 2008–10			
DRC EP4, 2010–			
			Iraq EP1, 2003–04 Iraq EP2, 2004–
Sudan 2 EP1, 2004–05	Sudan 2 EP1, 2004–05	Sudan 2 EP1, 2004–05	
Sudan 2 EP2, 2005–	Sudan 2 EP2, 2005–	Sudan 2 EP2, 2005–	
		Côte d'Ivoire EP1, 2004–05 Côte d'Ivoire EP2, 2005 Côte d'Ivoire EP3* 2005–10 Côte d'Ivoire EP4,° 2010–11	Côte d'Ivoire EP5, 2011–
Côte d'Ivoire EP5, 2011–			
Taliban EP1, 2010–11	Taliban EP1, 2010–11		Taliban EP2, 2011 –
Taliban EP2, 2011–	Taliban EP2, 2011–		
Libya 2 EP2,^ 2011	Libya 2 EP2,^ 2011	Libya 2 EP3,° 2011–	
			Libya 2 EP3° 2011 –
10/31 = 32%	1/9 = 11%	14/30 = 47%	4/10 = 40%

Effective sanctions regime episodes are indicated in **bold**. Sanctions effectiveness is distinguished by purpose as follows: * to coerce, ^ to constrain, ° to signal.

Notes

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The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD) is a private diplomacy organisation founded on the principles of humanity, impartiality and independence. Its mission is to help prevent, mitigate, and resolve armed conflict through dialogue and mediation.

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